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ABSTRACT
Policing Protests: An Exploratory Analysis of Crowd Management Policies
by
Logan P Kennedy
Several policing strategies have been used to manage protest crowds over the past 50
years. Research suggests that escalated force and command and control strategies were utilized
until the 1990’s (Bourne, 2011; Schweingruber, 2000), while negotiated management has as
emerged as a prominent protest management strategy within recent decades (Gillham, 2011;
Gillham & Noakes, 2006).While literature describes the general evolution of protest strategies
over time, there has been no systematic documentation of police approaches to crowd
management.
This study examines police policies governing protest management to identify current
U.S. police practices. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides model
policies to help police agencies become familiar with best practices and develop their own
policies. The IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control was used to identify
tactics that represent best practice standards for protest management in the United States.
Through a content analysis of policies from a sample of U.S. police agencies, this study assesses
agency compliance with the IACP model policy on crowd management and control, as well as
alignment with existing protest management strategies.
Findings inform our understanding of current police protest management practices and
offer policy implications. First, this study shows that there is a great deal of variation among
protest management policies used within the sample agencies. Second, sample agency policies
tend to adopt best practice escalated force tactics more often than command and control or
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negotiated management practices. Finally, three specific themes related to community-oriented
policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences emerge from bivariate and
multivariate analyses. These themes offer direction for future theory development and protest
management research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the media has portrayed police negatively, due to a number of
controversial use of force incidents (Rickford, 2016). These instances have affected the publics’
opinion of officers on the street, arguably making it more difficult for police to accomplish dayto-day tasks. Sir Robert Peel, the father of metropolitan policing, suggested in his nine principles
of policing that public support is paramount for officers to succeed in their position (Emsley,
2013). As such, the negative media portrayals of police affecting community perceptions of
officers, may also affect police ability to successfully maintain order.
Legitimacy has emerged as a salient policing concern within recent years. Research
suggests that, like Peel’s principles of policing, community support is essential for police to
maintain order within the community (Tyler, 2003). Police legitimacy has been studied
extensively, largely in relation to use of force and militarization. While police use of force is a
complex moral dilemma that influences research frequently, there are instances when it is
necessary to ensure officer and community safety. Ariel and Farrar (2015) contend that even
when force is used appropriately, it can have damaging effects on community relations.
Numerous agencies have recently revised use of force policies in response to public scrutiny
(Albrecht, 2011).
Police use of force incidents have affected more than just public perceptions of police;
social movements have begun protesting against police for perceived discriminatory tactics
(Rickford, 2016). This presents a unique challenge for United States police agencies; managing
the same protest crowds that are targeting police as a social issue. Police management of protests
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aimed at police has been heavily scrutinized, particularly following media coverage of
questionable policing tactics that have been employed during protests in the United States.
Recently, there have been several high-profile instances of controversial U.S. police
protest responses. In 2011, Occupy Oakland turned violent and police were rebuked for
indiscriminate use of impact projectiles (King, 2013). In 2014, the Ferguson unrest persisted for
days, while police were criticized for militarized tactics and prohibiting First Amendment rights
(Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). Many of the criticisms for police responding to
protests stem from what some perceive to be an unwarranted escalation toward increased use of
force. However, there are instances when use of force may be appropriate to maintain order and
safety. Recently, in Portland, an Antifa protest turned violent when protesters attacked Andy
Ngo, a reporter for an online magazine, during the event. Protesters responsible for the attack
were accused of throwing milkshakes mixed with quick-dry cement (Templeton, 2019). This is a
situation where police use of force to restrain or arrest Ngo’s attackers would likely be seen by
the public as an acceptable response.
Police protest management strategies have been a media and research focal point since
the Civil Rights era. Mid-twentieth-century America saw the use of contentious police tactics,
like indiscriminate applications of water cannons, tear gas, and impact rounds (McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). These techniques often led to
escalations of violence among the crowd, causing property destruction and injuries to police and
crowd participants. Such disastrous consequences persuaded police to reconsider their approach
toward protest crowds. Escalated force, or crowd dispersal, tactics were regularly adopted during
the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998;
Schweingruber, 2000). However, research suggests that protest management strategies have
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altered significantly since this timeframe (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, &
Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013).
Despite the transition in police tactics, the media and public citizens have continued
scrutinizing police protest management strategies following controversial use of force incidents
and tactics used to quell protest crowds. The increased publicity of these policing issues has
promoted numerous changes to policy and practice, including the increased use of militarized
tactics. Militarization has become increasingly controversial, with research suggesting that these
practices are oppressive (Moule, Fox, & Parry, 2019). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) contend that
militarization should be inversely related to police legitimacy, as these tactics are likely to lower
favorable public attitudes toward officers. However, Moule and colleagues (2019) state that
militarization is a function of legitimacy. If police are acting in a legitimate manner while using
militarized tactics, public citizens will not perceive their actions to be overly authoritative.
Despite this finding, increases in police militarization is highly contentious among the media and
general public. As such, police have begun adopting alternative tactics that are directly
associated with higher levels of perceived legitimacy. Most notably, police departments are
reportedly engaging in more cooperative techniques when managing First Amendment
gatherings. However, no systematic work has been conducted to determine the degree to which
current police protest management policies align with best practice tactics or strategies described
in the literature, nor have researchers assessed the level of variation across policies governing
protest management for U.S. police agencies.
Protest and crowd management policies can affect public perceptions of police. Crowd
control strategies were heavily practiced in the 1960s and emphasized coercing crowd
compliance (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Through these

3

tactics, police were instructed to use any means necessary to compel crowd obedience (McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Crowd control tactics have generated
negative perceptions toward police agencies across the United States (Kenny et al., 2001). In
response, police began adopting crowd management, rather than crowd control, approaches for
special events. Crowd management refers to the ability to effectively organize and facilitate
crowd movements (Abbott & Geddie, 2001), instead of simply responding to crowd violence
using coercive measures.
Successful crowd management requires an understanding of crowd-specific factors, such
as their intentions and motivations for participation. Specific police tactics facilitate this
understanding. For example, dialog with crowd organizers prior to and during a protest event is
often used by police to understand protester motivation (Borch, 2013; King & Waddington,
2006; Masterson, 2011). Research suggests that dialog is essential for crowd and officer safety
(Abbott & Geddie, 2001; Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Gorringe, Stott, &Rosie, 2012). This is
reinforced by the development and adoption of dialog-based approaches in European countries.
Police in other countries initially developed this model to promote order within crowds through
legitimate means (Borch, 2013; Gorringe & Rosie, 2011; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Due to
the comparative success of this tactic, dialog-based crowd management approaches have recently
emerged in the United States.
Some newly developed crowd management strategies have originated from other
approaches, like community policing, that emphasize public engagement and rely on residents to
assist police. The distinction between crowd management and control is rarely discussed
theoretically. In simplistic terms, crowd management is employed in the planning of events to
facilitate the First Amendment rights of the crowd, while crowd control is utilized when those

4

rights should be suspended due to an escalation of violence. While crowd management is a
highly praised approach that has gained traction within recent years, we still do not know the
degree to which agency policies and, in turn, practices reflect crowd management tactics or
traditional crowd control strategies. This study will examine the existing policies that govern
police response and the strategies they explicitly promote to manage and control protest crowds
in the United States.
The development of protest management strategies is guided by police perceptions and
understanding of crowds and crowd behaviors. One of the earliest theories of collective behavior
contended that crowds were destructive and had no control over their own behavior. Research
has significantly altered this perception throughout the years, with recent theorists arguing that
crowd participants have individual motivations and act in accordance with their personal goals.
Still, perceptions stemming from early and antiquated crowd theories continue to influence
discussions and practices designed to manage crowd behaviors (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).
The purpose of the current study is to explore police policies governing crowd
management to identify current protest management practices in the United States. This study
assesses the degree to which current policies align with (1) tactics recommended by a national
police organization–the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and (2) the basic tenets of
three prominent protest management strategies (i.e., negotiated management, command and
control, and escalated force). This dissertation also examines the relationship between agencyand jurisdiction-level characteristics and the content of police agency protest policies. The
current study provides the first national-level empirical assessment of police protest management
tactics used in the United States.
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Overview of Study
As mentioned previously, U.S. police departments have significantly altered policy and
practice associated with policing protests (Masterson, 2011). The historical shift in protest
management strategies has been previously framed by theoretical perspectives concerning crowd
behavior. Theories of collective behavior are rarely subjected to empirical assessment. However,
some case studies have examined how crowds and police interact with one another and report
outcomes of these interactions (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996;
Stott & Reicher, 1998). These case studies provide at least partial support for existing crowd
psychology and management theories. Police legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003),
the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016), and the
Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984;
Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) are three of the most prominent theoretical frameworks
used to explain when and why protesters are more likely to accept police intervention during
protest events.
Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of currently accepted theoretical frameworks used
to explain police-protester interactions. Specifically, this section will expound upon how police
legitimacy, the RDFC Interaction Model, and the ESIM explain crowd compliance and defiance.
Following this is a summary of the literature pertaining to sociological and crowd-level factors
found to impact protest violence. Specific attention is paid to protest participant motivations and
how these motivations affect propensities for violence. Next, there is a historical overview of the
evolution of police protest management strategies in the United States. Each of these strategies is
reviewed in relation to the theoretical background that influenced their inception—specifically,
Gustave Le Bon’s contagion theory, Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory, the RDFC
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Interaction Model, and the ESIM. Additionally, emerging protest management strategies in the
United States are discussed in relation to their efficacy in other countries. The use of dialog
policing is highly praised in Europe, and the United States appears to be shifting toward this
approach with current protest management strategies. Finally, there is a brief discussion of how
existing police policies can be used to examine current police practices. Previous research has
constructively analyzed agency policies to examine how agencies respond to vehicle pursuits,
and it is suggested that those research methods can also be employed to examine protest
management strategies.
Chapter 3 examines the methods used to conduct the current research. First, the study
overview discusses policies to examine police behavior within various contexts. This is
accomplished by examining police policies’ degree of compliance with the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on crowd management and control, as well
as the alignment with existing theoretical protest management frameworks. Following this, the
research questions for this study are explicitly stated and then discussed in terms of their
relationship to previous literature and their contribution to future research. Third, the data are
described in detail, including the specific variables that are examined for this study, as well as
each data source. A brief explanation of the study’s sample and population of interest is also
provided. Fourth, the independent and dependent variables are described and examined based on
their relation to previous literature and theory. Finally, the analytical plan utilized for this study
is illustrated, with brief descriptions of the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical
techniques employed.
Chapter 4 provides the analysis results, as well as brief explanations of the findings in
light of the proposed research questions. The first question explores whether existing police
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policies comply with best practices proposed by the IACP model policy. Findings emphasize the
most and least frequently adopted tactics recommended by the IACP, as well as the degree to
which current U.S. police crowd management policies follow best practice recommendations.
The second question investigates how current agency policies align with three predominate
protest management strategies. Findings highlight the most commonly adopted techniques within
each strategy, as well as emphasizing characteristics of those agencies that are most and least
closely aligned with each management strategy. Third, and finally, bivariate correlations and
linear regression models are presented, thus identifying significant associations between agencyand jurisdiction-level variables and tactics proposed by the IACP model policy, as well as the
three major protest management strategies.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the study’s contribution to
current literature. Specifically, a discussion is provided to describe the findings in light of three
notable outcomes concerning the impact of community-oriented policing, jurisdiction-level
characteristics, and regional variation in policy content. Next, the general strengths and
weaknesses along with the implications of this research are explored. This research offers
practical recommendations for police policy and practice, as well as a potential roadmap for
future research. Finally, this dissertation concludes with a brief discussion of how this study
contributes to and expands upon previous literature and accepted knowledge of police practices.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Early crowd theorists contended that crowds were irrational, destructive forces of nature
(Le Bon, 1895; Sighele, 1891; Tarde, 1898). Promoting this perspective was Gustave Le Bon,
the theorist credited with establishing crowd psychology as a field. The Le Bonian perspective
contends that crowd participants experience irrationality and a sense of de-individuation, or
contagion (Le Bon, 1895). Le Bon’s contagion theory emphasizes a loss of individualism within
the crowd, while contending that participants are only capable of negative emotions. This theory
is the basis for the term “mob mentality” in social psychology. While later research provides
alternative explanations for crowd violence, some studies suggest that the Le Bonian perspective
still drives police protest management practices (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).
The act of protesting has been defined as an expression of views, to the public or
government, on social and political issues (Bourne, 2011). John Lofland (1985) defines protest as
acting on extreme feelings and dissension against a single entity in a public forum. Bourne’s and
Lofland’s definitions hold that protesting occurs through an expression of values that targets an
individual or institution. Additionally, the expressions within this process are typically the result
of relative deprivation, or perceived injustices against a group (Isaac, Mutran, & Stryker, 1980;
Runciman, 1966; Stoeffer, Suchman, Devinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). W. G. Runciman
(1966) contends that relative deprivation occurs when a group’s rights do not align with those
afforded to other populations. For example, during the Civil Rights era, African-Americans were
deprived of basic human rights that other populations in the United States were guaranteed.
Some of the most prominent protests stemming from perceptions of relative deprivation in recent
years have involved issues of racial inequality.
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Recently, Black Lives Matter has engaged in a number of protests focusing on perceived
discriminatory tactics by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com,
2013). One highly publicized event was the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson,
Missouri, police officer, which called into question tactics that were used against members of the
minority community. This shooting sparked protests nationwide, with the objective of
discontinuing excessive use of force by police (Rickford, 2016). When the officer responsible for
the shooting was acquitted of criminal charges, some Ferguson residents engaged in riotous
behavior that resulted in numerous injuries and millions of dollars in property damage (Chasmar,
2014). The Ferguson unrest became one of the most notorious and violent events in modern
history.
In 2017, the protest in Charlottesville, South Carolina, brought attention to white
nationalist movements. This event was catalyzed by the planned removal of a controversial
statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from Charlottesville’s Emancipation Park. White
nationalists argued that it was a Confederate monument signifying a period of history crucial to
their party’s formation. Counterdemonstrators argued that the statue was disrespectful to
minority populations, as it symbolized slavery during the Civil War. They contested that the
beliefs of the Confederate party were founded on hate and, therefore, should not be memorialized
within the park. During the event, white nationalists marched through the local university
campus with torches, chanting Nazi-related slogans (Keneally, 2018). The tension between the
two parties culminated when one of the attendees accelerated his car through a crowd of
counterdemonstrators, injuring dozens and killing one protester.
Also in 2017, a May Day demonstration in Portland, Oregon turned violent. May Day is
an international day emphasizing labor rights, that occurs on May 1st annually (Nowak, N.D.).
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The event in Portland began peacefully with speakers urging participants to support immigrants’
rights in the workforce. As demonstrators marched toward the waterfront, participants began
throwing rocks, cans, and Molotov cocktails (Ryan, 2017). Police responded to this violence by
engaging in crowd dispersal tactics. The violent behavior during this event led to 25 arrests and
the vandalization of multiple establishments.
In Ferguson, Portland, and Charlottesville, the common theme among participants was
the feeling of inequality. Whether inequality is felt from current practices or previous
transgressions, it has been a major reason for public demonstrations over the last half-century.
While some theories have argued that relative deprivation is the basis for protesting (Stoeffer et
al., 1949), others have expanded upon this idea by arguing that it more specifically explains
protest violence (Isaac et al., 1980).
Preventing violence is the primary goal of police when they act as crowd managers
(Borch, 2013; Madensen & Knutsson, 2011). In the United States, freedom of speech is one of
the fundamental rights afforded to citizens. As crowd managers, police face unique challenges in
protest scenarios, due to the necessity of balancing individual rights with societal safety. This
dissertation examines how police approach crowd management and how, according to previous
literature, police tactics influence protest crowd behaviors.
Compliance or Defiance: A Theoretical Explanation of Defiance Within the Crowd
Tom R. Tyler (1990) introduced the idea of procedural justice in his seminal book, Why
People Obey the Law. Prior to this publication, research was specifically interested in
discretionary police behaviors. Many studies examined the types of outcomes that were
associated with police discretion (i.e., arrests) (Pilavian & Briar, 1964). Over time, research
became less interested in the outcomes of police decisions and more focused on the process
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associated with their decision-making. Police legitimacy translated the idea of procedural justice
from the courts to police, emphasizing the importance of positive police-citizen interactions.
According to this theory, citizens are especially concerned with how they are treated by
authorities and the transparency of decision-making processes (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Studies
have demonstrated that, when people are treated fairly and the decision-making process is
transparent, the outcome of the decision is not as detrimental to citizen perceptions of police
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Essentially, when police use fair and just discretionary practices and
explain how they came to their decision, they are more likely to be perceived favorably
(Mazerrole, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013). When the public perceives the police
in a legitimate manner, they are more likely to comply with police directives (Blader & Tyler,
2003). Findings from previous research reinforce the argument that when police are perceived as
unjust, the public will feel alienated, thus leading to defiance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).
Defiance can be defined as the resistance of police directives or interventions (Sherman,
1993). Crowd research has previously examined defiance toward police, and many explanations
emphasize their use of authority as a central reason for crowd noncompliance (Madensen &
Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996). According to the theories of procedural justice
and police legitimacy, when police over-exert or inconsistently employ their authority, the crowd
may view this as justification for defiance (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Madensen &
Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The use of illegitimate tactics emits
feelings of alienation within the crowd, thus increasing the likelihood of noncompliance (Drury,
Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Crowd defiance
can lead to disastrous, even violent, consequences. These theories and related research suggest
that police practices play a pivotal role in the outcome of protest violence.
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While procedural justice and police legitimacy are two of the most common explanations
for defiance, other theories expand on the legitimacy of police behaviors and the impact defiance
has on violent outcomes. Two such theories are the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen,
2017; Madensen, Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012; Sousa & Madensen, 2016) and the Elaborated
Social Identity Model, also known as the ESIM (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984;
Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998).
The RDFC Interaction Model emphasizes the types of behaviors that police should
exhibit to increase levels of legitimacy. Madensen and colleagues (2012) argue that when police
demonstrate reasonable, disarming, focused, and consistent behaviors, the public will voluntarily
comply with police directives (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Madensen Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012;
Sousa & Madensen, 2016). The first dimension, reasonable, refers to the extent to which police
adhere to discretionary decisions or legalistic approaches when they manage others’ behaviors
(Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). According to Sousa and Madensen (2016),
the public is more likely to comply with police directives that protect citizen rights and are
necessary to prevent harm. Many police agencies tasked with crowd management accentuate the
importance of protecting citizen rights (Masterson, 2011). When police policies do not follow
these guidelines, crowds may be more likely to defy their authority.
When police are disarming, they de-escalate volatile situations without physical force
(Clouse, 2018; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This is especially relevant in
today’s climate as many agencies are engaging their officers in verbal de-escalation training
(Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). While dialog is important for police to de-escalate
situations, image can also influence volatile interactions. Sousa and Madensen (2016) contend
that officers in soft uniforms are perceived as less threatening than those in full riot gear. When
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police adopt militarized tactics, the likelihood of violence increases (Myers-Montgomery, 2016).
Disarming (i.e., non-hostile and non-threatening) tactics are hypothesized to increase the
likelihood that crowds will comply with police directives (Sousa & Madensen, 2016).
The focus dimension refers to using force only against problematic individuals in a crowd
instead of targeting whole groups. This dimension draws largely from the ESIM, which argues
that groups in a crowd have differing motivations. According to the Le Bonian perspective,
crowd members lose all sense of individuality upon participation in the group (Le Bon, 1895).
The ESIM refutes this argument, stating that crowd members still hold their individual beliefs
and values during crowd participation (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher,
1996). Rather than operate under the crowd’s single mindset, participants tend to form groups
based on their objectives, and these smaller assemblies make up the larger crowd (Drury &
Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Stott, 2011). As
such, identity is dynamic and shifts temporarily toward group-based attributes. Upon
participation in the crowd, the individual adopts the predominant identity that aligns with the
objectives of their specified group, not the crowd as a whole.
The ESIM expands upon the Le Bonian perspective by explaining crowd behavior from
an intergroup lens (i.e., how crowd participants interact with one another) rather than from the
traditional intragroup perspectives (i.e., how crowds interact with other entities). This
perspective is typically used to explain how the interaction between groups within the crowd can
result in defiance against police and overall crowd violence. When, for instance, peaceful
protesters and violent anarchists are present within the same crowd, police should focus their
intervention efforts on the problematic anarchists while protecting the rights of peaceful
protesters to avoid larger crowd violence. By targeting the violent anarchists, police are focusing
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only on those engaged in harmful behavior and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate
authority figures (Eck & Madensen, 2016; Sousa & Madensen, 2016).
Finally, consistency relates to the actions of police across similar contexts and time (Eck
& Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This dimension argues that police reactions to
protesters should be congruent across similar situations over time. Consistent behavior is
predictable, and since the crowd knows what type of police actions to expect, they will not be
provoked by unexpected police intervention (Eck & Madensen, 2017). Consistency ties the rest
of the dimensions together. If police behavior is erratic, public confidence will most likely be
reduced, especially if the directive seems to be motivated by bias (Clouse, 2018; Sousa &
Madensen, 2016). When police behavior aligns with the RDFC Interaction Model, officers are
more likely to be perceived favorably, which also diminishes the possibility of defiance within
the crowd. Increasing compliance within the crowd is essential to reducing violence during
protests.
Protest Violence
The right to gather peacefully and express personal and societal views is the cornerstone
of a democratic society. However, once these events become violent, that constitutional right
becomes limited. In the United States, collective behavior is often stigmatized and directly, if
unfairly, associated with violence. As such, regardless of motivations, police responsible for
crowd management often view demonstrators as a single entity (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).
Contrary to popular belief, only about ten percent (10%) of protests result in violence
(Davenport, Soule, & Armstrong, 2011).
Protest crowds typically differ in their motivations and behaviors from other groups
(Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Aligning with the Le Bonian (1895) perspective,
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modern researchers contend that negative emotions are often the motivation for protest
participation. Negative emotions—anger, frustration, alienation, anomie—are often the result of
perceived injustices against an individual or a group (Isaac et al., 1980; Jasper, 1998; Smelser,
1963; Stoeffer et al, 1949; Runciman, 1966). That complex of feelings may predictably result in
violence.
Previous research has examined numerous protest factors associated with violence, but
none of those studies included recent events. While much of the protest research is outdated and
may not accurately reflect the nature of protests today, a general level of consensus among the
earlier findings identified factors commonly associated with violent protest outcomes. The
factors discussed in the following section are outlined within two general categories: crowd-level
factors and sociological factors. Crowd-level factors are group-level elements that represent the
physical nature of the crowd (e.g., demonstrator race and number of protesters). Sociological
factors can be defined as social factors that arise from the community or society (e.g., protester
motivation, target of protest, and police presence).
Crowd-level factors. While a number of crowd-level variables may be attributed to
violence, two specific crowd-level factors are routinely associated with protest violence:
demonstrator race and protest size (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980).
Black Lives Matter emerged in 2013 with the objective of eliminating perceived
discriminatory police practices in the United States (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com,
2013). This prominent social movement has often been compared with the Civil Rights
movement, due to the similarity of their motivation for protesting (Rickford, 2016). During both
time periods, African-Americans perceived relative deprivation. While empirical studies have
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been conducted on protest violence during the Civil Rights era, protests surrounding the Black
Lives Matter movement have only been discussed theoretically.
Previous research suggests that protests with more Black participants experience higher
rates of violence (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980). Relative deprivation
theory attributes this to limited opportunity for the black community to affect social change
(Isaac et al., 1980). For instance, during Black Lives Matter protests, Black community members
have felt disproportionately targeted by excessive use of force (www.blacklivesmatter.com,
2013). When peaceful protest does not accomplish its intended goal, those perceiving relative
deprivation feel that violence is the only viable alternative (Isaac et al., 1980).
Black citizens’ feelings of deprivation have been documented since the Civil Rights era
and through the Black Lives Matter movement (Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford,
2016). Civil Rights–era blacks fought to obtain basic human rights that were guaranteed to other
populations in the United States. Restrictions placed on these black populations included
segregation in schools and perceived discriminatory practices by businesses. Although these
prejudiced practices have diminished over time, many studies argue that such racial disparities
are still present today (Rickford, 2016). Case in point: Black Lives Matter contends that AfricanAmericans are deprived of the right to safe interactions with police. Research concurs that
minorities are targeted disproportionately by police use of lethal force (Engel & Calnon, 2004;
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).
While demonstrator race has been largely associated with violence, protest size is also a
factor: larger protests tend to be more violent than smaller ones (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger,
1973). As more demonstrators engage, police become less familiar with participants and their
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motivations and, in turn, are more likely to rely on aggression to force compliance than on
coordination with protesters (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2007).
Boston Police Chief William Evans stated, “If we go in expecting a fight, that’s what
we’ll get” (Peak & Sousa, 2018). This quote accentuates the importance of cooperation between
police and protest organizers. As discussed in the following section, familiarity between police
and organizers breeds trust and cooperation. Building lasting relationships between police and
protesters promotes positive experiences for all parties involved (King, 2013; Gillham & Noakes,
2007). Recently, these cooperative approaches have become more prevalent for crowd
management. Coordination with crowd members assists police in their efforts to discern the
shifting identities within the group.
Crowd-level factors are crucial in understanding group behaviors. However, without
knowledge of external influences, research is limited in explaining why groups behave in a
specific manner. The interaction between crowd-level and sociological factors is essential to
identifying the situational contexts of protest violence.
Sociological factors. Sociological factors are societal-level variables that provide
environmental context for the occurrence of protest violence. They explain how societal disputes
can motivate people to engage in protest and why they have targeted specific entities. Previous
research highlights three such factors: protest motivation, protest target, and police presence
(Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973).
Protest motivation and target are inherently associated with one another. Motivation is
defined as the reason that demonstrations occur (Eisinger, 1973). A common motivation within
recent years is the perceived use of excessive force by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016).
The target of the protest is the entity toward which the event is being directed (Eisinger, 1973).
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Indeed, police have been the target of recent protests due to perceived increases in lethal force
against members of the Black community (Rickford, 2016).
This example emphasizes systemic issues that affect specific populations at a
disproportionate rate. Black Lives Matter contends that systemic racism inherently occurs within
the United States criminal justice system (www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). Systemic racism
arguably accounts for the media’s highlighting of overtly aggressive tactics by Black Lives
Matter and the resultant public perception that black protesters have a greater predisposition to
violence than protesters in other social movements (Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford, 2016). To the
contrary, research suggests that many protesters associated with Black Lives Matter do not incite
or condone violence during their events (Hoffman, Granger, Vallejos, & Moats, 2016; Rickford,
2016).
Police responsible for managing crowds during Black Lives Matter events face unique
challenges. They experience the unique dynamic of being crowd managers at the same
demonstrations that are targeting them for perceived discriminatory tactics. When police are both
crowd manager and protest target, it is difficult to rely on cooperative techniques because of the
demonstrators’ lack of trust. Still, while some sociological factors predict violence, police have a
decisive impact on the demonstration’s outcome. Their use of overtly authoritarian tactics
increases the possibility of crowd rebellions against them (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011;
Reicher, 1984; Drury & Reicher, 2000).
Police presence has been routinely correlated with protest violence: when police are
present, the likelihood of violence increases substantially (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger,
1973). While police play an instrumental role in the protest outcome, no studies have examined
the mediating effect that police management strategies may have on violence. Previous studies
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have examined only whether police were present at the event, and most do not distinguish
whether police were crowd managers for the event or were responding to calls for service due to
a threat of violence. Additionally, there have been no large-scale empirical studies of police
protest management strategies; that discussion is purely theoretical and typically supported by
individual case studies. Tactics representative of each of the strategies have not been examined
to ensure they align with existing research or theoretical models–an understanding that is
essential to educating police on appropriate responses to protests. Currently, United States police
agencies continue to be educated on the Le Bonian perspective (Hoggett & Stott, 2010), which
highlights crowds as destructive forces of nature (Le Bon, 1895). However, recent research has
emphasized that this theory is limited in its explanation of collective behavior, as it does not
explain lawful and peaceful assemblies.
Police Response to Protests: Historical Progression of Crowd Management
Protest policing research dates back to the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et
al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). One of the most frequent themes across this research is the adversarial
relationship between police and demonstrators. The perceived use of indiscriminate force by
police during demonstrations has been sensationalized in the media, leading to lower levels of
perceived legitimacy by society (King, 2013; Rickford, 2016). Media coverage of these events
has increased the scrutiny of police behavior, with many arguing that they are employing
“illegitimate” tactics during protests (King, 2013).
Police have employed four prominent protest management strategies over the last sixty
years. Some of these strategies emphasize formal social control and tactics that may be perceived
as less appropriate. However, in recent years, there has been shifts in proposed best practices of
protest management strategies. Contemporary studies suggest that dialog and cooperation are
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important in preventing protest violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie,
2012; King, 2013). Each of these four strategies—escalated force, command and control,
negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation—will be discussed in detail, including their
central tenets and the theoretical perspectives that influenced them.
Escalated force. The earliest, and arguably most scrutinized, form of protest
management is escalated force, a reactive type of policing often associated with shows and use of
force to coerce compliance (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). Many agencies utilize this strategy when a
protest escalates toward violence or becomes a civil disturbance (IACP, 2014). Heavily used
during the Civil Rights era, this approach is based on the assumption that crowds are irrational
and destructive (Della Porta & Reiter, 2016; Le Bon, 1895; Schweingruber, 2000) and that
aggression by demonstrators justifies equal or greater force by police to disperse the crowd
(Schweingruber, 2000).
There are five dimensions of police behavior that define escalated force (McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998). First, police ignore First Amendment rights in the face of
escalating violence and disorder (Schweingruber, 2000) because violence necessitates immediate
dispersal. Second, police are responsible for dispersing crowds to prevent community disruption.
Because crowds are perceived as disruptive to routine activities, police are tasked with their
dispersal, so there is no tolerance for their formation. Third, due to this intolerance of collective
behavior, police have no prior communication with protest leaders. Some research suggests that
escalated force strategies are linked to violence due to police aversion to cooperation and
communication (King, 2013; Kingshott, 2014). Fourth, mass arrest is used against those
engaging in civil disobedience so that the crowd will disperse, deterring further disorderly
behavior. When this proves ineffective, police employ indiscriminate force on the crowd—the
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fifth element of escalated force (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber,
2000).
The use of force to disperse crowds is a defining trait of escalated force strategies
(Schweingruber, 2000). Use of force is employed during civil disturbances to enforce police
directives. When force is employed indiscriminately, the crowd may perceive it to be an
illegitimate use of force and resist police directives (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott
& Reicher, 1998). Force is employed indiscriminately when police target the entire crowd, rather
than focusing on those unruly participants (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott, Drury,
& Reicher, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). The use of indiscriminate force has been controversial,
and is often perceived as an illegitimate policing tactic, due to the increased possibility of
injuring nonviolent bystanders. Alternatively, previous literature contends that police behaviors
perceived as legitimate increase public willingness to comply with police directives (Eck &
Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2012)
The Le Bonian perspective of crowds as irrational and disruptive provides the framework
for escalated force strategies (Hoggett & Stott, 2010; Le Bon, 1895). Contagion theory argues
that the crowd operates under a single mindset (Le Bon, 1895). This perception of crowds
justifies the use of indiscriminate force, as this may be necessary when the entire crowd is noncompliant and engaging in violence (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). The threat of large-scale violence
or serious property damage requires the police to ensure societal safety, so their primary goal is
to disperse the crowd by any means necessary (IACP, 2014; Schweingruber, 2000). Because
such force often leads the public to perceive police in an illegitimate manner (Hoggett & Stott,
2010; Murray, 2010), police have altered their approach to lawful assemblies (Bourne, 2011).
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Command and control. Command and control emerged as the prominent paradigm of
protest crowd management during the 1980s, when there was a heavy emphasis on the impact of
community disruption (Vitale, 2005). While this strategy promotes a slightly more accepting
view of collective action and more emphasis on First Amendment rights than escalated force
strategies does, the act of protest is still seen as a form of community disruption (Bourne, 2011)
because crowds interfere with routine activities.
Previous research contends that command and control was derived from the use of strict
enforcement tactics (Lough et al., 2010; Vitale, 2005). This approach entails adopting a strict,
legalistic approach for enforcing minor offenses (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). These types of tactics
have often been equated with the use of zero-tolerance policing, which is controversial due to its
perceived discrimination toward minority communities (Harcourt, 2001). The adoption of this
approach correlates with command and control due to the low tolerance for community
disruption. Command and control strategies involve the restriction of time, place, and manner of
protest (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005) to minimize the potential for community disruption.
Additionally, those protesters engaging in disruptive tactics would likely be subjected to
immediate removal from the crowd, as this aligns with strict enforcement tactics (Harcourt,
1998; 2001). Police agencies aligning with this model may facilitate First Amendment
assemblies until crowd members violate the restrictions placed on them by police. While
restrictions are an essential component of command and control strategies, there are other crowd
management tactics that align with this model.
Vitale (2005) introduced five necessary elements for a strategy to be classified as
command and control. First, there must be aversion to community disruption. Police must do
everything in their power to prevent demonstrations from interfering with routine community
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activities. This is generally accomplished by placing restrictions on the event and its attendees,
through tactics like spatial containment (e.g., barricades). Second, access to the event itself is
controlled. Police employ barricades to separate the crowd from the public and limit the entry
points into the crowd. Wilson and Kelling (1982) discuss two types of disorder: social and
physical. Protest crowds are perceived as social disorder when they disrupt the activities of the
general public. Therefore, dispersing crowds to ensure that bystanders do not participate is a
pivotal component of this strategy. Third, the police should divide-and-conquer protest
participants. Using additional barricades within the crowd to separate protest groups diminishes
the effect the groups have on each other and reduces contamination among bystanders. Fourth,
there should be a shock-and-awe component to the protest management strategy. Agencies
should deploy as many officers as the resources allow to deter unlawful or unpermitted behavior.
The sheer mass of officers present is meant to act as a deterrent to the crowd as a whole. The
fifth, and final, element of command-and-control strategies is zero-tolerance policing. As noted
previously, strict enforcement strategies are often equated with this style of policing (Harcourt,
1998; 2001), thus creating an impact on the development of command and control strategies
(Vitale, 2005). Over time, however, the restrictions placed on protest crowds became more
controversial, leading to the development of cooperative techniques.
Negotiated management. Negotiated management emerged as a protest management
strategy during the 1990s. Negotiated management emphasizes the use of dialog between police
and demonstrators throughout the planning and demonstration process (Gillham, 2011; King,
2013). Literature highlights negotiated management as a desirable protest management strategy
for police agencies in the United States. Recently, and historically, relationships between police
and specific communities have been tumultuous. As such, researchers have promoted the use of a
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cooperative protest management strategy between police and protesters to diminish the
possibility of violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Research suggests that
coordination and dialog between both parties stimulates mutual respect (Murray, 2010) and
emphasizes public order, while also promoting legitimate societal perceptions (Gorringe &
Rosie, 2009; Murray, 2010). Like the transparency component of police legitimacy and
procedural justice, when police are able to explain their decision-making during protest
management, they are more likely to be perceived positively (Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Tyler,
1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Previous strategies of protest management operated through
extensive social control with little coordination between police and protesters.
Emphasizing dialog and planning through relationship building is essential in both
negotiated management and community policing. Research suggests that this shift in protest
management is partially oriented toward the popularity of community policing in the 1990s
(Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale, 2005), a decade preceded by a
complicated history of violence between police and minorities. This strategy attempts to restore
this complex relationship through community involvement, often accomplished by allocating
specific officers to designated neighborhoods, which increases familiarity and trust with police
and provides officers with unique insight into the community’s problems (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 1994). Similarly, negotiated management partners specific officers with protest
leaders, increasing trust in police during protests (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie,
2009) and subsequently decreasing the possibility of violence.
Previous researchers suggest that negotiated management is derived from communityoriented policing, but the adoption of these tactics would not have been possible without Wilson
and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows theory. Cullen (1997) asserts that broken windows was the
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“blueprint of community policing,” and many suggest that this approach led to a new era of
inclusive policing in the United States (Xu, Fiedler, & Flaming, 2005). While much research
emphasizes the link between disorder and crime (Braga et al., 1999; Skogan, 1990), the more
central elements of broken windows seem to have been understated. Broken windows related
more closely to community policing than sometimes presented in academic literature. Kelling
(2019) contends that community policing is often perceived as a soft on crime approach, equated
with “hug a thug.” However, the community policing approach is driven by community
concerns, which can evoke more aggressive crime prevention policing. The seminal aspect of
broken windows, much like community-oriented policing, is the necessity of community input
and relations to drive police response toward crime (Bratton & Kelling, 2014). This often results
in communication between police and the community to highlight the issues facing residents.
While negotiated management is portrayed a highly desirable strategy by researchers,
some argue that this approach can be used oppressively. King (2013) offers Occupy Oakland, in
late 2011, as an example of how attempts to engage in negotiated management, without full
embrace of its police-protester cooperation principles, can fail if police resort to repressive
tactics. Police managing this event prohibited food and blankets through the permits issued to
protesters. Those who violated the prohibition were told to disperse or be subject to arrest.
Criminalizing the use of food and blankets—protester behaviors typically considered lawful—
led the crowd to rebel, resulting in a violent altercation between police and protesters (King,
2013).
Occupy Oakland highlights the importance of building and maintaining trust between
police and protesters. When a breakdown of trust occurs or unanticipated behaviors occur within
the crowd, police are not able to employ cooperative methods. In the absence of cooperative
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methods, police may turn to crowd management strategies that emphasize formal social control
(Gillham & Noakes, 2007).
Strategic incapacitation. Strategic incapacitation typically begins as a coordination
between police and protesters, but when a breakdown of trust occurs, it combines focused
aspects of escalated force, spatial containment, and command and control—not against the whole
crowd, but against problematic groups within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham,
Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Schweingruber, 2000). The targeting of
problematic individuals ensures that police behaviors are focused and are not used
indiscriminately against an entire crowd (Sousa & Madensen, 2016).
Strategic incapacitation is theoretically grounded within the ESIM and the focus
dimension of the RDFC Interaction Model. Both perspectives contend that police are perceived
as more legitimate when they target only harmful behaviors rather than generalize their actions to
the entire crowd (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck and Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher,
1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). With strategic incapacitation, police
agencies employ the same dialog-based approach used in negotiated management until the
transgressive protesters or outside agitators are encountered (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe
& Rosie, 2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2007). Transgressive protesters typically belong to anarchist
or counterdemonstrator groups, are unfamiliar to police (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, &
Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007), and engage in unpredictable tactics (Tilly, 2000),
usually with the aim to incite violence or aggression. Because their presence creates difficulties
when attempting to engage negotiated management strategies, police target individuals within
the crowd who pose a legitimate threat to peaceful protest.
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The ESIM argues there are multiple social identities present within a crowd, and police
should only focus their efforts on the problematic identities that hold higher propensities for
violence. According to this perspective, the problematic individuals within the crowd would be
transgressive protesters, as their methods are unknown to police prior to the event (Gillham,
2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). By focusing police efforts
on problematic individuals within the crowd, police may be perceived in a less overtly
authoritative and more legitimate manner. The focused aspect of this strategy leads to more
favorable public perceptions.
Spatial containment against transgressive protesters is executed through the designation
of hard zones, soft zones, and free-speech zones. Hard zones are areas protesters are prohibited
from entering to restrict their interactions with protest targets (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards,
& Noakes, 2012). The boundaries are frequently sites of contention due to the separation
between protesters and their targets (Noakes, Klocke, & Gillham, 2005). Soft zones are typically
adjacent to hard zones and temporarily suspend First Amendment rights (Gillham, 2011). When
protesters enter soft zones, they declare to the police that they are transgressive protesters
(Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012), which provides police the rationale to suspend their First
Amendment rights and order them to immediately disperse from the event. Disobedience with
police directives further substantiates the use of force to compel compliance. Finally, free-speech
zones are locations police allocate as acceptable for the expression of First Amendment rights
(Gillham, 2011). These areas are typically placed adjacent to the soft zones and outside the
vicinity of hard zones so there is no possibility of interaction between protesters and targets
(Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012). Each serving a specific function to diminish protest
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violence, these zones are typically utilized when there is an imperative to separate two or more
groups that have volatile relationships (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2006).
Spatial containment and the focused use of force have been characterized by some as
illegitimate police tactics (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; King,
2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2006). While historically controversial, the use of force and less-lethal
weapons is sometimes necessary to ensure societal safety, especially when violent agitators are
present. Much research contends that focusing on problematic individuals is a legitimate
approach to protest violence (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984;
Reicher, 1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998), but it can prove difficult in
practice because most transgressive protesters are not initially identifiable. An exception is the
Black Bloc; members of this anarchist group dress the same: blue jeans, a black hooded
sweatshirt, and a decorative Guy Fawkes mask. They do this to increase their anonymity, but
police can more easily identify them as problematic individuals. The United States has recently
seen a resurgence of the Black Bloc, in the left-leaning anti-fascist movement, or Antifa. This
group poses challenges for U.S. police. However, such anarchists have been around for decades
in North America and Europe, where police are highly experienced and have reported success in
Black Bloc protest management.
Comparative Policing Practices
Protest management is a complex task, and many U.S. police agencies have struggled to
find acceptable methods to accomplish it. Other countries have experienced success in
preventing protest violence, much of it born from the use of dialog to build partnerships with
protest leaders. Two prevalent practices discussed in conjunction with one another are dialog
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policing and public order policing, which originated in Sweden and the United Kingdom
(Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012) and have spread to other countries due to their popularity.
Dialog policing is a cooperative approach that encourages discourse and coordination
between police and protesters (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012). According to David Baker
(2014), dialog creates an opportunity to set boundaries, limit challenges, and establish
expectations between police and protesters. Sweden has experienced success through the
employment of dialog officers because of the amount of training these individuals undergo to
become certified. Their training utilizes tactics like interviews with protest organizers to
understand their wants and needs (Wahlstrom, 2007). Coordinating with protesters ensures that
police practices are transparent, which is essential for police legitimacy (Mazerolle, Bennet,
Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990). Ultimately, the
Swedish Dialog Police have provided an international example of how to manage protest crowds.
In an attempt to emulate this specialized unit, dialog-based approaches have emerged in
the United States (Baker, 2014; Lovell, 2009), though it still remains a rare approach to U.S.
protest management. Specific components of the strategy, dialog and coordination, have been
emphasized in other approaches, such as negotiated management, but those approaches have not
experienced the same success as dialog policing has elsewhere, due to the lack of extensive
discourse training in the United States (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008).
Public order policing (POP) was specifically created to manage crowd events. Like many
previous policing strategies, this perspective perceives crowds as disorderly and disruptive to the
community, an inherent threat to the social order (Reicher, Stott, Drury, Adang, Cronin, &
Livingstone, 2007). Stephen Reicher and colleagues (2007) outline four elements of public order
policing: intelligence, facilitation, communication, and differentiation. Intelligence refers to
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being familiar with the social identities of the crowd: police should be aware of who is in the
crowd and the motivations that drive their participation. This element is heavily derived from the
ESIM, insinuating that crowds do not experience de-individuation. Rather, police should
understand that social identities are fluid within a crowd and members typically adopt an identity
aligned with the morals and values they traditionally hold (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003;
Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Facilitation ensures that demonstrator
goals are considered during the planning process, which can be achieved only through
cooperation between police and protesters to ensure a safe and successful event. Communication
facilitates police and protester objectives, diminishing the dissatisfaction among the crowd,
which, in turn, reduces the likelihood for violent outcomes (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale,
2005; Wahlstrom, 2007). Police legitimacy, procedural justice, and the ESIM all hold that
increasing transparency in the decision-making process is essential to increasing crowd
satisfaction (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Tyler, 1990; Sunshine
& Tyler, 2003). Dialog should not only be used prior to the event, but also during the event for
any necessary problem-solving (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Gorringe, Rosie, & Stott, 2012).
Differentiation, the final component of POP, accentuates the social context of crowds. While Le
Bon (1895) believed that crowds lack social context and their motivations do not impact their
behavior, proponents of POP assert that protest crowds hold different motivations than spectator
crowds (Holton, 1978) and these motivations play a role in the possibility of violence (Reicher,
Stott, Croning, & Adang, 2004; Wahlstrom, 2007). Public order policing is one of the most
prevalent approaches to crowd management in the United Kingdom because it emphasizes
societal safety and preparedness for the possibility of violent outcomes (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie,
2012).
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Police-community relations are also more progressive in other countries than in the
United States, perhaps partially due to fewer use of force incidents in other countries (The
Economist, 2014). Several controversial uses of force within the last decade have played a role in
straining the relationship between police and minority communities, providing additional
motivation for protest events against U.S. police agencies. This dynamic of protests—police
tasked with crowd management when they are also targets of the event (Davenport et al., 2011;
Eisinger, 1973)—is unique, creating additional challenges for police that may not be present in
other countries.
This commentary is not to suggest that dialog and public order policing would be
ineffective in the United States. Rather, these approaches may need to be altered to account for
the distinctive police-community relations in the United States. There is a constitutional right for
lawful assembly in the U.S., but there are also negative connotations associated with crowds
(Blumer, 1968; Le Bon, 1895). Altering how crowd managers perceive crowds is the first step in
diminishing protest violence, achievable by training them from theoretical perspectives that
account for social contexts (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996;
Reicher & Stott, 1998). Creating a more positive outlook for lawful assemblies can help
eliminate the stigma associated with crowds. Second, assuring that crowd dispersal techniques
are focused on problematic groups will reduce the crowd’s propensity to rebel against police
(Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Reicher
& Stott, 1998; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). Third, creating trust is essential for any protest
management strategy (King, 2013), and this can typically be accomplished only when police
employ transparency in their decision-making process (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler,
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2003; Tyler, 1990). Through the adoption of these three elements, protest management strategies
can work to repair community relations and ensure societal safety.
Policy Research
Examining police behavior, particularly the use of discretion, presents a complex
research task. An immense amount of discretion can be employed during police-citizen
interactions (Pilavian & Briar, 1964; Sherman & Berk, 1984), as well as a high degree of
variation in how individual officers approach specific events. Discretion grants police the
autonomy to decide how much of an effort should be made to enforce specific laws (Goldstein,
1963) and whether they should approach unlawful behavior from a legalistic or humanistic
perspective. Legalistic approaches emphasize a strict enforcement of laws with little discretion
(Wilson, 1978), while a humanistic approach allows for police to utilize discretionary practices
based on the situation (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Because such subjectivity creates difficulty in
measuring police decision-making, researchers have designed unique methods to assess police
behavior and discretionary practices.
One of these, content analysis, inspects police policies (e.g., those governing vehicle
pursuits) that outline acceptable officer behavior (Alpert, Kenney, Dunham, & Smith, 2000;
Bayless & Osborne, 1998; Hicks, 2006; Lum & Fachner, 2008). However, it is important to note
that police policies do not always align with evidence-based practices. Typically, police policies
are drafted based on practitioner knowledge of acceptable behavior—a knowledge derived from
situational experiences rather than data-driven practices. And policies are generally reactive in
nature, altered based on incidents highly covered in the media. For example, the IACP model
policy on crowd management and control is regarded as best practice. However, the
effectiveness of this policy has not yet been directly tested or fully substantiated by research
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evidence. Still, much of the policy’s content is grounded in existing theoretical frameworks,
indirect research evidence on police legitimacy, and experiential-based practice. While, many of
the tactics advocated in the policy are based on professional experience, rather than research
evidence, practitioner field experience offers an alternative form of evidence that agencies can
rely upon in the absence of rigorous academic studies.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS

This study examines a select cross section of United States police agencies to provide a
summary of current protest crowd management strategies. This is accomplished by analyzing
agency policies that direct crowd management practices. Individual agency policies are reviewed
and analyzed to determine the degree to which individual policies align with best practices and
current protest management strategies discussed within the literature. An analysis of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on crowd management and
control was conducted to identify specific tactics advocated as best practice for managing
various protest crowds (e.g., lawful assemblies/demonstrations, civil disturbances). This analysis
was used to create a coding instrument with items that are used to measure the degree to which
individual agency policies align with strategies and tactics considered to represent best practices
in the field (i.e., the IACP model policy).
The IACP is the largest global professional organization that attempts to influence police
practices by promoting positive change among agencies (www.theiacp.org, 2019). One of the
functions of this international organization is the production of model policies for agencies to
adopt or to refer to when revising their existing policies. The IACP draws upon the professional
experience and expertise of influential police executives and leaders, as well as research
findings, to produce model policies. As the largest professional police organization in the world,
the IACP plays the role of an unofficial governing agency that greatly influences U.S. police
organizational policies. Over 30,000 IACP members in more than 150 countries have direct
access to a library of model policies that govern a wide array of police activities, including
crowd management and control (www.theiacp.org).
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Comparisons between individual agency policies and IACP model policies have been
conducted in the past, although this method has not yet been employed to examine protest
management policies. The overarching analytic framework proposed for this study follows the
methods used by Lum and Fachner (2008) to assess United States police vehicle pursuit policies.
In their study, a thematic analysis was conducted to identify general themes within the IACP
model pursuit policy. Following the identification of common themes within the policy, a series
of dichotomous (yes/no) questions was created to assess the degree of agency policy compliance
with the IACP model policy themes. This same method was employed to create a coding
instrument that identifies the degree to which police agency policies align with the IACP’s model
policy on crowd management and control.
Alpert and colleagues (1996) contend that efforts should be increased to improve policies
in specialized areas, stating that there is a lack of data to drive these guidelines. The IACP’s
model policies provide necessary frameworks to move toward national standards for police
behaviors in specific contexts (Lum & Fachner, 2008). While the IACP’s model policies are
based on a combination of research, practitioner expertise, and advisory board input, this is not
the only organization to produce recommendations for police behavior in specialized contexts.
There are other organizations, like the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), that outline
acceptable standards for police conduct in a number of contexts. Recently, PERF has produced a
best practice guide for police response to mass demonstrations (Police Executive Research
Forum, 2018). Still, Lum and Fachner (2008) argue that the creation of IACP’s model policies
represents an important step toward establishing national policing standards. Building upon this
research, the current study uses methods similar to Lum and Fachner’s and uses the IACP’s
model policy on crowd management and control, while acknowledging that other best practice
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standards are available. The purpose of this study is to provide a better understanding of current
protest management strategies and tactics being used by various police agencies across the
United States, as well as examine factors that might account for variation in policy content across
agencies.
Research Questions
As mentioned previously, police can attempt to facilitate lawful assemblies while
assuring societal safety during protests (Vitale, 2005). Achieving both goals can be difficult
when individuals participating in lawful assemblies become violent. When protests become
violent, participant, community, and officer safety supersedes the facilitation of First
Amendment rights. Therefore, specific police tactics may become necessary that were not
appropriate to use prior to acts of violence (e.g., arrest, use of force, crowd dispersal techniques).
In an attempt to outline the context in which specific police tactics are most appropriate, the
IACP developed a model policy on crowd management and control. This study employs three
research questions to determine the degree to which current police agencies comply with IACP
recommendations, assess alignment with protest management strategies, and account for
variation across agency policies.
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a
sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model
policy on crowd management and control?
This research question explores the degree to which current police policies comply with
the IACP’s recommendations for crowd management and control. For this study, the IACP’s
model policy was analyzed to identify tactics they advocate as best practice. The IACP policy
provides suggestions for how police should approach various circumstances in protest contexts
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(e.g., lawful assembly, civil disturbances). A 45-item instrument was created to measure agency
policy compliance with practices recommended by the IACP. Higher scores indicate greater
compliance with the IACP’s recommendations.
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically based strategy themes (i.e.,
escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within
the IACP model policy?
This research questions explores the degree to which current police policies align with
the three general protest management themes identified in the literature review: escalated force,
command and control, and negotiated management. Previous studies outline specific practices
used by police to manage protest crowds (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; King, 2013;
Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). The discourse surrounding these practices notes how police
approaches to protest management have changed over the past several decades. These
discussions are typically based on case studies involving general observations of police tactics
used at specific protests. To date, no empirical study has been conducted to determine the degree
to which current police policies are aligned with one or more of the general protest strategies
(i.e., escalated force, command and control, or negotiated management). For this study, specific
tactics advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control were categorized
into three themes, each theme representing one of the three general protest strategies. Fifteen
specific items/questions were then created to code the degree of individual agency policy
alignment with each of the three themes. Appendix B provides the questions contained in the
coding instrument, as well as a reference to the source statements in the IACP model policy and
justification for theme categorization (i.e., why a specific item was created to assess alignment
with a particular protest management strategy).
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The United States operates under a decentralized policing structure. As such, variation
among the policies of individual agencies is expected. The analysis answers the following
question to attempt to understand existing differences in practices across agencies.
3. Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with the overall degree of
compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?
Past studies on protest violence acknowledge that event-specific factors are often related
to the likelihood of protest violence. As such, studies often acknowledge the impact that police
can have on aggression within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011; Gillham, 2011;
Eisinger, 1973; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000). This study examines the association between
agency-level characteristics that might influence police perspective or ability to adhere to current
best-practice strategies. Agency-level characteristics that will be examined include measures of
agency size, percentage of black officers, percentage of minority officers, officer educational
attainment, agency militarization, the adoption of community policing strategies, use of force
strategies, and the presence of specialized units.
Like agency-level characteristics, jurisdictional characteristics have not previously been
examined in relation to police protest management policies. Yet, previous research suggests that
community characteristics could theoretically influence the tactics adopted by specific police
agencies (Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980; Walgrave Rucht, & Van Aelst, 2010). As
such, differences among crowd management policies could be associated with community
characteristics, including violent crime rate, population size, educational attainment,
unemployment rate, poverty level, and percentage of black residents. In addition, there may be
regional differences in the level of compliance with the IACP model policy and general protest
management strategies. Previous research suggests that protest violence varies by region. With
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violence occurring more frequently in specific regions, it is hypothesized that there are also
regional differences in the content of policies that agencies adopt to respond to civil
disturbances.
Data Collection
Data in this study are collected from multiple sources: current police policies governing
crowd management for demonstrations/civil disturbances (i.e., policies provided by individual
agencies), consolidated information from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the 2017Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the 2017
American Community Survey (ACS), and the Defense Department’s Defense Logistics 1033
program datasets. The specific variables to be collected from each data source on protest
management tactics, agency-level characteristics, and jurisdiction-level characteristics are
described below.
Protest management policies. Policies and procedures on protest management tactics
were collected for a specific cross section of U.S. police agencies. Policies pertaining to protest
management include directives on First Amendment gatherings, civil disturbances, canine units,
use of force, less-lethal weapons, arrest procedures, and civil disturbance units/mobile field
forces. These policies provide detailed information on protest management tactics that officers
are directed to engage in for lawful assemblies and violent civil disturbances. These policies
describe specific tactics, including planning for demonstrations, provisions for use of force, and
spatial containment during protest events. Protest management policies were collected online
through department-specific and third-party websites. For policies not readily accessible online,
a formal public information request was submitted directly to the police agency. For those,
policy requests that were denied, the associative agency was excluded from the sample and a
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new agency was selected. More information about the sampling method is provided later in this
chapter. Additionally, the IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control was obtained
through the IACP’s website.
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). Data on
agency-level characteristics were collected through the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2013 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. This dataset compiles
information on over 3,000 agencies within the United States and includes agencies with over 100
sworn personnel (Hyland, 2018). The 2013 data are the most recently available data provided by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. While these data were released pre-Ferguson (November 2014),
and it is entirely possible that agencies updated their practices in response to this event, this
dataset still provides the most recent data available. The LEMAS data set is considered the most
comprehensive and highest-quality data on police administrative statistics. To ensure that this
data would be available for analysis, the sample of police agencies used in this study was drawn
from agencies represented in this dataset. 1
Uniform crime report (UCR). Jurisdictional crime data were obtained from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s 2017 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for all jurisdictions of agencies
included in the current study. These data include crimes reported by agencies to the FBI between
January 1, 2017 and December 1, 2017. The Part I crime rate reported per 100,000 populations
was collected to assess the relationship between crime levels and adherence to the IACP model
policy and strategy themes. The Uniform Crime Report is one of the nation’s leading data
sources on crime rates in the United States (Berg & Lauritsen, 2016). This dataset measures the
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While the agencies in this dataset represent only about 10% of the overall population of police
agencies, a much larger proportion of the agencies of interest (i.e., those serving jurisdictions
with 25,000 or more residents; approximately 80%) are included in this dataset.
41

amount of crime in the United States as reported by police agencies. Approximately 95% of all
police agencies in the United States report crime statistics to the UCR (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2017).
American community survey (ACS). The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017 American
Community Survey (ACS) was utilized to collect data on jurisdiction-level characteristics. The
ACS is conducted annually in the United States to gather demographics for citizens at the
county, city, state, and national level. This dataset includes variables like median income,
educational attainment, and percentage of Black community residents within a jurisdiction. The
ACS is one of the most comprehensive sources of data on community demographics in the
United States. The sample included in the 2017 survey represents over two million households
and reports a 95% response rate (Torrieri, 2018).
Department of defense: Defense logistics agency 1033 program. The Department of
Defense’s Defense Logistics Agency 1033 program dataset was utilized to examine militarized
costs by U.S. police agencies. This dataset provides descriptions and costs of militarized
equipment for specific police agencies in the United States. The 1033 program allows the
transference of Department of Defense property that might be destroyed to state and local police
agencies. The data included in this dataset range from January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2015.
Sample and Population
As discussed previously, this study examines a select sample of U.S. police agencies to
understand current police approaches to protest management. Specifically, this study examines
agencies with jurisdictional populations of over 25,000 citizens. According to the BJS’ 2013
LEMAS data, there are 867 police agencies that serve populations with 25,000 citizens or more
(Hyland, 2018). The list of police agencies responding to the 2013 LEMAS survey, which
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provides administrative statistics on U.S. police agencies, was used to draw a sample of agencies
for the current study. Selecting agencies from this dataset ensures that those included in the
sample also have agency-level characteristics available for analysis. The response rate for the
2013 LEMAS survey was 80% and included 2,780 agencies in the United States (Reaves, 2015).
In order to include a diverse cross section of U.S. police agencies, sample selection is
stratified by both jurisdictional population size and region of the United States. Disproportionate
stratified sampling is used to examine the variation of agencies across the United States. This
sampling strategy is especially useful to provide detailed analyses on small samples (Daniel,
2012). Agencies are first stratified according to jurisdiction population, which created five strata:
agencies policing populations of 25,000–49,999, 50,000–99,999, 100,000–199,999, 200,000–
499,999, and 500,000+. Following this, agencies are then stratified by region of the United
States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are four regions of the United States: West,
Midwest, South, and Northeast. Table 1illustrates the number of agencies that are selected within
each category. Appendix B provides a list of agencies that were selected within each strata.
The sample consists of all agencies that serve populations of more than 500,000, often
referred to as super agencies, since protests are more likely to take place in large urban areas
(Eisinger, 1973; Walgrave, Rucht, & Aelst, 2010). Thirty-nine of the 44 super agencies are
included in the current sample. Policies for 5 super agencies were not obtainable due to requests
for agency policies being denied. All other agencies were given unique identifiers and randomly
selected, through a random number generator, for analysis within each region for each of the four
remaining population strata (n = 5 for each population/region strata). Note that the stratum for
Northeastern agencies serving populations between 200,000 and 499,999 citizens contains only
five agencies, so the entire population was selected for analysis. However, two of the agencies in
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this stratum denied the public information request based on the policy not existing or not being
available for public dissemination.

Table 1: Sample Stratification
Population Size
500,000
200,000 – 499,999

100,000 – 199,999

50,000 – 99,999

25,000 – 49,999

Region of the United States
N/A
West
Midwest
South
Northeast
West
Midwest
South
Northeast
West
Midwest
South

Sample Size (n)
392
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Northeast
West
Midwest
South
Northeast

5
5
5
5
5
N = 117

Total:

If agency policies were not available online, formal Freedom of Information requests
were submitted to the agency for the policies of interest. If the request was denied—due to the
absence of a policy relating to protest crowds or to the policy’s being considered privileged
information—the agency was then excluded from the sample and a new agency was randomly
selected. However, this sampling with replacement strategy was not possible for the
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The super-agency category consists of 44 agencies. Only 39 were available as public
information. The remaining agencies denied public information requests, citing these policies as
law-enforcement privileged information.
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superagencies and 200,000-499,999 Northeast categories due to the entire population being
selected for analysis.
This study lacks sufficient power to generalize the findings to all police agencies in the
United States due to the limited number of agencies included in the final sample (n =117).
However, this exploratory study will be the first to provide a general picture of police protest
management tactics across the United States and begin to assess the degree of variation among
agencies’ crowd management strategies.
Agencies Not Included in the Sample
Overall, 30 agencies were sampled with replacement after policies could not be obtained
from the initially selected agencies. Agencies were not included in the sample for multiple
reasons: gave positive indication that their policies would be distributed but never did so (n =
10), did not respond to the request (n = 8), refused for legal reasons (i.e., not a state resident,
policies were considered tactical operations plans) (n = 4), or did not have a crowd management
policy in place (n = 8). Differences were noted for agencies that are included in the sample and
those that could not be included in this study3. However, the sampling method used in this study
was designed to maximize differences between the agencies examined in the sample. This study
does not attempt to generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies.
Variables
Independent variables. The independent variables for this study include agency- and
jurisdiction-level characteristics. While previous research has examined policies governing
police behavior within specific contexts (e.g. police pursuits), the literature rarely identifies

3Analyses

reveal that agencies for which policies could not be obtained were typically larger, had
fewer black officers, served jurisdictions with fewer high school graduates, and served
jurisdictions with higher unemployment and poverty rates.
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factors that lead agencies to adopt specific policies. This study will explore whether particular
agency or jurisdiction characteristics are associated with the adoption of tactics emphasized
within the IACP’s model policy or various protest management strategies.
The first variable employed is size of agency, which is operationalized as the number of
full-time sworn personnel within an agency. Cordner (1989) contends that larger agencies tend to
allocate more personnel to specialized units, which results in the possibility that these agencies
receive more training in these areas. Previous research suggests that larger agencies are more
likely to adopt policies pertaining to special areas (Lum & Fachner, 2008). Larger agencies
typically have more resources, which can be used for training if new policy directives are
adopted. Additionally, larger agencies also have more recourses to create the types of specialized
units that are referenced in best practice policies. As such, larger agencies may be more likely to
continually revise policies and adopt current best practices for protest management. Agency size
is examined to determine the level of association with specific differences in protest management
policies.
Measures representing minority and black officers within the agencies are continuous
variables indicating the percentage of sworn officers who are members of these communities.
This measure is indicative of the extent to which an agency contains diversity in their ranks.
Within recent years, agencies have become especially focused on diversifying their organizations
to become more representative of the communities they police (Peak & Sousa, 2018). As such,
agencies with more diversity may be more likely to adopt tactics that align with more
progressive protest management strategies.
Educational attainment is operationalized by examining the percentage of officers with a
Bachelor’s degree or higher. This measure, available through the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is
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operationalized as a continuous variable to examine the education level of sworn officers within
each agency. Increasing levels of educational attainment is another recent focus within police
agencies to diversify and reduce the amount of force used by officers. As mentioned previously,
research shows that officers with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to use
reasoning skills and engage in de-escalation practices before using force (Oliva, Morgan, &
Compton, 2010). Additionally, agencies with better educated officers are more likely to have
positive community relations (Peak & Sousa, 2018), which leads to greater levels of trust
between community residents and police. Given that the IACP model policy promotes the use of
de-escalation tactics and negotiated management practices, agencies with better educated officers
and community relations may find it easier to align their policies with these recommendations.
The use of dialog within protest contexts is promoted as a method to diminish the likelihood of
violence (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).
While the use of dialog has been associated with lower rates of protest violence, police
militarization has been associated with increased aggression (Wood, 2014). Police militarization
has been a controversial topic for many years, especially after the use of militarized tactics
during the Ferguson riots (Kiker, 2014; Rickford, 2016). Kraska (2007) defines police
militarization as “the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and
sometimes implementing violent conflict” (p. 503). Wood (2014) suggests that police
militarization during protests has increased since September 11, 2001. Since the events on this
day, police have been especially concerned with protests becoming security threats, and
militarized agencies are more concerned with dispersing antagonistic crowds in order to prevent
potential threats from escalating (Ullrich, 2017). Agencies that spend more on militarization may
be more willing and able to adopt recommended best practices or specific tactics associated with
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escalated force. Militarization is measured based on the amount of money agencies spend on
militarized equipment, standardized per officer, as available through the DOD’s 1033 program.
This measure offers a picture of the degree of agency militarization, while also accounting for
size and budgetary differences by standardizing the cost per officer.
Agency adoption of community policing strategies is measured through a series of items
that examine community policing practices within the agency. Research has long confirmed a
link between community characteristics and crime. This link affects how police maintain order
and enforce laws in the community. Areas that are more socially disorganized (i.e., higher
minority populations, crime rates, unemployment rates, and poverty levels) typically receive
more police services. Recent findings suggest that community characteristics may also influence
police reaction to protests. For instance, research suggests that Black Americans are perceived by
police as more threatening during protests (Davenport et al., 2011). This may influence the types
of policies and general strategies adopted by agencies, but no research has yet been conducted to
test this assumption. First, whether the organization has a community policing focus in their
written mission statement is examined. This variable, available in the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is
coded as such: a written mission statement is absent or does not have a focus on community
policing (0) or community policing is emphasized in the statement (1). Two other measures of
community policing examine if recruits and current officers receive eight hours or more of
community-oriented policing training. This variable provides a measure of the proportion of
officers who receive this amount of training: (0) less than half or (1) over half. Finally, whether
officers are regularly assigned to specific beats is measured dichotomously as yes (1) or no (0).
This measure represents the familiarity between officers and the communities they police.
Additionally, the percentage of officers routinely engaging in patrol within the same areas is
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examined. This continuous measure assesses the proportion of the agency who is routinely
responsible for the same area. Community policing is often linked with specific protest
management strategies, including negotiated management (Lough, Halliday, & Dobrzynski,
2010).
Police use of force and the discretion associated with employing force is often
controversial. The IACP model policy includes multiple directives on the use of force in crowd
contexts (IACP, 2014). As such, agencies that authorize all officers to use various methods of
force may be more willing to adopt IACP model policy directives related to specific use of force
guidelines. Agency use of force strategies are measured through agency responses concerning
whether all sworn officers (1) or only some or no sworn officers (0) are authorized to use each of
the following types of force: less-lethal weapons, impact projectiles, chemical agents, or physical
force. The 2013 LEMAS survey asked specific questions about the use of various types of
physical force, including open hand, closed hand, restraint, and takedown use of force techniques
(Hyland, 2018). Each of these will be examined independently.
Specialized training and units can prove beneficial for police agencies. For example,
agencies with mobile field forces have units trained specifically to respond to civil disturbances
(Carter, 2002). The presence of specialized training will be measured through two 2013 LEMAS
survey items. First, whether the agency does (1) or does not (0) have dedicated personnel trained
to engage in special operations (e.g., SWAT, SRT) is included. Second, the specific number of
specialized units within the agency overall will be examined. Each of these variables help
measure the degree to which officers receive training for specialized contexts.
The violent crime rate of each selected jurisdiction is compiled through the FBI’s 2017
Uniform Crime Report. This variable will be operationalized as the number of Part I crimes

49

reported per 100,000 population. As protest research often examines the occurrence of violence
during these events, the jurisdiction’s violent crime rate may be indicative of the likelihood of
these incidents during protests and may influence police response. This study will examine the
relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rates and differences in police protest
management strategies.
Research suggests that most protests occur in urban environments and many activists
engaging in protest are university students (Walgrave et al., 2010). Further, there are often
negative stigmas associated with those who choose to engage in activism, sometimes related to
the job status of protest participants. Population size, percentage of high school graduates (e.g.,
those who may be eligible to attend college), unemployment rate, and percentage of the
population that falls below the poverty level is examined using ACS data to determine if these
jurisdictional characteristics are associated with differences in police protest management
strategies.
As many recent protests are related to Black Lives Matter (Rickford, 2016), this study
examines the relationship between differences in police policies and the level of racial diversity
in the jurisdiction. Larry Isaac and colleagues (1980) contend that members of the black
community are more likely to resort to violence during protests because of the perceived lack of
legitimate options to be heard. This, in turn, may promote the adoption of specific policing
tactics. To assess the relationship between population diversity and police practice, the
percentage of black residents within each jurisdiction is obtained from the 2017 ACS.
Dependent variables. The dependent variables represent the degree of compliance with
the IACP model policy, as well as adherence to specific protest policing themes for each
specified agency. Dependent variables are measured using a coding instrument that includes the
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questions contained in Appendix B. Each item requires a dichotomous response (i.e., yes or no).
The general degree of compliance with the model policy for each agency policy is measured by
the total number of items (n = 45) coded as “yes” (1) or “no” (0). Measures of the degree to
which each agency’s policy adheres to a specific protest management theme—negotiated
management, command and control, or escalated force—is assessed using the responses to items
contained in each section of the coding instrument (n = 15 for each theme/strategy). The
justification column in Appendix B notes when reverse coding is used to reflect adherence to a
specific theme. The resulting scale scores, for overall compliance as well as each theme, are used
to assess degree of compliance with the IACP model policy (range = 0 – 45), as well as level of
alignment with the three existing protest management strategies (range = 0 -15).
Analytical Plan
This study employs both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods to explore the
degree of compliance with the IACP model policy and protest policing themes. Initially, the
IACP model policy on crowd management and control was subjected to a thematic analysis to
identify frequently discussed tactics and themes. This analysis was used to develop questions and
produce the coding instrument used in the current study. First, questions were created to
represent the IACP’s model policy recommendations concerning the use or restriction of specific
protest policing tactics. These items were then categorized based on the existing theoretical
protest policing approaches to create themes (i.e., negotiated management, escalated force, and
command and control). Finally, 15 items that best captured the essence of each theme were
selected to create the final 45-item coding instrument.
Descriptive statistics are provided to assess the degree of compliance with the IACP
model policy, as well as the level of adherence to each of the three protest management themes.
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These analyses help to determine the degree of variation across current crowd management
policies adopted by the selected U.S. police agencies. It also begins to describe the degree to
which any one particular protest management strategy is currently used over others.
Bivariate correlations and linear regression models assess the relationship between
agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with degree of compliance with the IACP model
policy and reliance on the three protest management strategies. Linear regression models are
generally employed to examine the effect of a set of attributes on a continuous dependent
variable (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012). In this study, the dependent variables utilize
continuous values that are representative of the degree of compliance with the IACP model
policy and the levels of reliance with negotiated management, command and control, and
escalated force. Due to the continuous nature of the scales used to measure the dependent
variables, linear regression is the most appropriate analysis for this study. Additionally, due to
the small sample size (which increases the likelihood of Type II error) and the exploratory nature
of this study, there is sufficient reason for statistical significance to be measured at a .10 alpha
level (two-tailed) in the current analyses (Labovitz, 1968; Sliva, 2015).
Interrater Reliability
The subjectivity of content analyses is often discussed as a limitation relating to
reliability (Patton, 2015). To control for the subjectivity of this study, two researchers separately
coded the agency policies. Coding of agency policies occurred simultaneously between the
researcher and an outside coder over a month-long period. The researcher provided the outside
coder with the purpose of the study, the coding scheme, and content analysis procedures. The
outside coder was a first-year doctoral student at the same academic institution as the researcher.
The results of the coding analysis showed that the coders agreed on approximately 87% (.866) of
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the overall items. Following the coding analysis, a neutral third party re-analyzed discrepancies
and made a formal decision on which coding was more accurate. This coding was then used for
the policy analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
This dissertation examines three research questions relating to how police manage protest
crowds. The current study attempts to answer 1) To what degree do department policies
governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices
advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control?, 2) To what degree do
these policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., negotiated management
command and control, and escalated force) identified within the IACP model policy?, and 3) Are
agency and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of compliance and
compliance with strategy themes within the IACP model policy?
A series of univariate descriptive analyses are used to assess department policies’ degree
of compliance with the IACP model policy on crowd management and control, as well as the
level of compliance with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e. escalated force, command and
control, and negotiated management). Bivariate correlations evaluate relationships between
agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the extent to which agencies comply with the IACP
model policy and protest management themes. Finally, regression models employing
agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics are used to predict compliance with the IACP model
policy and theory-based themes. Presentation of these findings follows.
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a
sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model
policy on crowd management and control?
Degree of compliance with the IACP model policy is assessed through the use of a 45item instrument that asked dichotomous questions relating to whether the policy authorized
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specific tactics to manage protest crowds. The agencies in this sample scored between 0 and 45
on this instrument, with a score of 0 representing a policy containing no tactics that align with
the model policy and a score of 45 representing a policy authorizing the use of 45 tactics
identified within the IACP model policy. The mean score for the sample’s overall compliance
with the IACP model policy is 15.4 (median = 14), indicating relatively low alignment among
agencies. Figure 1 presents IACP model compliance percentages for each tactic.
While the average department policies align with only about a third (34.2 percent) of the
IACP model policy tactics examined, at least two specific tactics advocated by the model policy
are present in almost all of the sample’s policies. The two requirements found most often in this
sample are the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident
Management System (NIMS) protocols and restrictions on the use of chemical agents (i.e.,
chemical agents are only used when lesser force is ineffective). Both of these tactics are present
in 93 of the 117 (79.5%) department policies within the sample. These tactics represent opposing
protest management themes. The ICS/NIMS protocols are routinely used to plan for lawful
assemblies, which aligns with negotiated management strategies. However, chemical agents are
used for crowd dispersal during violent incidents, which aligns with escalated force strategies.
Analysis reveals great variation in degree of compliance across department policies. Only
one agency has policies that require all 45 crowd management tactics advocated by the IACP
model policy. The department with the second highest compliance score requires 43 of the 45
model policy tactics. Policies from two agencies do not require any of the 45 IACP model policy
tactics. Five of the ten IACP model policy tactics most frequently found in the sample policies
align with escalated force strategies. These five tactics guide the use of chemical agents
(79.49%), Tasers (66.47%), and aerosol sprays (64.1%), while also allowing mass arrests
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Figure 1: Percentage of IACP Compliance by Tactic
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(56.41%), and stipulating that disorderly crowds should be dispersed (45.30%). This finding
indicates that, among this sample of U.S. police agencies, department policies commonly offer
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guidance concerning appropriate tactics for using force against crowds. Among the ten rarest
IACP model policy tactics found within the sample policies, seven align with command and
control strategies. The current analyses reveal that command and control strategy tactics (e.g.,
restricting protest activities, spatial containment) are among the least common practices
contained within this sample’s policies. Policy alignment with particular protest management
strategies is further explored in the following section.
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e.,
escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within
the IACP model policy?
Three sub-scales within the protest instrument are used to evaluate department policy
alignment with three general protest management themes. Each sub-scale consists of 15 items,
with possible scores ranging from 0 to 15. The mean score for the sample’s overall alignment
with negotiated management tactics – like planning, the use of dialog, and acceptance of protest
activities – is 5.9 (median = 5), with a range of 0 to 15. As mentioned earlier, the most frequent
negotiated management tactic found within sample policies is the use of ICS/NIMS protocols
(79.5%). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security created these protocols to help agencies
prepare for and respond to special events or disasters. The least adopted negotiated management
tactic present in policies is the requirement for supervisory approval to enact an arrest. Only 10
of the 117 sample agencies (8.55%) require supervisory approval for arrest. While the average
number of negotiated management tactics found in agencies’ policies is relatively low (39.3%),
six specific tactics are present in about half of the sample. Aside from the most frequent tactic,
common policy requirements include the necessity of verbal warnings before using physical
dispersal tactics (53.8%), planning for the possibility of needing additional personnel (51.3%),
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requiring neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), specific directives for spontaneous civil
disturbances (48.7%), and requiring a written action plan for all demonstrations (47%). Figure 2
presents the percentage of policies containing each negotiated management tactic.

Figure 2: Percentage of Policies Containing each Negotiated Management Tactic
Presence of ICS/NIMS
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The mean score for the sample’s overall alignment with command and control tactics –
including protest activity restrictions to prevent community disruption and the use of spatial
containment – is 4.2 (median = 4), with a range of 0 to 14. The most common policy requirement
from the command and control theme is the allowance of specialized units (e.g. Mobile Field
Force, Civil Disturbance Unit, SWAT) for crowd dispersal, which is present in 73 of 117
(62.4%) agencies’ policies. Other frequently-adopted components from this management
strategy include the use of perimeters for civil disturbances (58.1%), use of temporary detention
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areas following mass arrest (43.6%), prohibition of canine use for crowd control activities
(27.4%), and restricting bystanders from entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Figure 3 presents
the percentage of policies containing each command and control tactic.

Figure 3: Percentage of Policies Containing each Command and Control Tactic
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Finally, the mean score for the sample’s overall alignment with escalated force tactics –
including use of force, crowd dispersal, and mass arrest tactics – is 8.1 (median = 8), with a
range of 3 to 13. The sample policies contain more escalated force practices than the other two
crowd management strategy tactics (i.e., negotiated management and command and control
tactics). Five of the most commonly adopted escalated force tactics are present in at least half of
the sample agencies’ policies. These tactics include restricting tear gas use when lesser force
would be ineffective (79.5%), prohibiting TASER’s to restraint/arrest purposes (66.7%),
restricting aerosol agents to those engaging in unlawful behavior (64.1%), allowing mass arrest
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(56.4%), and requiring arrest for unlawful behavior (53.8%). The common theme among all of
these tactics is the use of force and arrest to disperse crowds. Only about half of all agencies
restrict crowd dispersal tactics to disorderly or violent crowds.

Figure 4: Percentage of Policies Containing each Escalated Force Tactic
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3. Are agency and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of
compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?
As mentioned previously, research has determined that there is a relationship between
event characteristics and protest violence, but no studies have assessed the impact of agencies’
protest management strategies on violence. Before this can be examined in future research, this
study documents variation in the protest tactics that are permitted by agency policies and
potential correlates that may help to explain the context that promotes the adoption of particular
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crowd management tactics. This study explores relationships between agency and jurisdictional
characteristics and the use of particular protest strategies. There is reason to expect that such
relationships exist. For instance, previous literature highlights the relationship between agency
adoption of community-oriented policing and the use of the negotiated management strategy
(Lough et al., 2010), agency use of force experiences and the adoption of the escalated force
strategy (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), and the
availability of specialized units and the use of the command and control strategy (Vitale, 2005).
Pearson’s r correlation values and linear regression models are used to examine these and other
possible relationships.
Correlations
Agency level characteristics. Pearson’s r correlation reveals significant relationships
between six agency-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy. A weak positive
correlation is found for the number of sworn officers (r = .53, p < .10), implying that as the size
of an agency increases, so does degree of compliance with the IACP model policy. Two
variables commonly linked with a community policing focus are associated with model policy
compliance. The diversity of the agency matters; a weak positive correlation exists between
departments with more black officers and degree of compliance (r = .188, P < .05). Agencies that
utilize information from community surveys also have higher compliance scores (r = .162, p <
.10). Further, three specific use of force variables are associated with model policy compliance.
Agencies with use of force policies authorizing soft projectiles (r = .182, p < .10), chemical
agents (r = .180, p < .10), and leg hobbling techniques (r = .203, p < .05) have higher degrees of
IACP model policy compliance. The model policy restricts the use of these types of force to
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situations in which alternative tactics would be ineffective. As such, these restrictions would
only be adopted by agencies that authorize their officers to use these types of force.
Many of these same variables are correlated with the adoption of specific protest
management strategies and related tactics. For instance, agencies that use information from
community surveys (r = .158, p < .10), authorize the use of chemical agents (r = .210 , p < .05),
or allow the use of leg hobbling techniques (r = .191, p < .05) are likely to use more negotiated
management tactics. Previous research suggests that agencies with more educated officers may
be more likely to adopt negotiated management strategies (Lough et al., 2010). The current study
supports this finding. As the percentage of officers in a department with a bachelor’s degree
increases, so does alignment with negotiated management tactics (r = .229, p < .05).
Significant relationships exist between five agency-level variables and the adoption of
command and control strategies. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and
control tactics (r = .223, p < .05). Like previous models, agency percentage of black officers (r =
.225, p < .05) and percentage of minority officers (r = .206; p < .05) are moderately correlated
with command and control crowd management. Further, there is a moderate relationship between
agencies use of community surveys and the adoption of command and control tactics (r = .205, p
< .05). Only one use of force variable is significant; the association with use of chemical agents
is weak and positive (r = .173, p < .10).
While multiple agency-level characteristics are correlated with the adoption of negotiated
management and command and control strategies, only one is related to escalated force. When
agencies are authorized to use soft projectiles, reliance on escalated force tactics decrease (r = .160, p < .10). This negative relationship implies that while many agencies have authorized the
use of impact projectiles, not all policies place restrictions on the use of these types of weapons.
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Table 2 provides Pearson r values for correlations between all agency-level variables and
model/strategy compliance.

Table 2: Agency-Level Characteristic Correlations
Variable

IACP
Compliance
.153*

Negotiated
Management
.070

Command and
Control
.223**

Escalated Force

.141

.079

.225**

.090

.188**

.128

.225**

-.028

Percent
Bachelor’s
Degree, by
Agency

.121

.229**

-.003

.135

Militarized
Equipment Cost
by Officer

-.132

-.144

-.080

-.026

C.O.P. Recruit
Training

-.037

-.102

.083

.088

C.O.P. In
Service Training

-.065

-.026

-.104

.085

Officers
Regularly
Assigned to
Same
Beats/Areas?

.078

.042

.118

.012

Percent of
Officers
Regularly
Assigned to

-.016

-.027

.009

-.134

Number of FullTime Sworn
Personnel
Percent Black,
by Agency
Percent
Minority, by
Agency
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-.068

Same
Beats/Areas?
Agency Utilized
Information
From
Community
Survey?

.162*

.158*

.205**

-.024

Authorization
for Use of
Batons

.039

.013

.031

-.139

Authorization
for Use of
Impact Weapons

.061

.087

.048

.064

Authorization
for Use of Soft
Projectiles

.182*

.123

.139

-.160*

Authorization
for Use of
Chemical
Agents

.180*

.210**

.173*

-.071

Authorization
for Use of
Tasers

.036

.008

.034

-.114

Authorization
for Use of Neck
Restraint

-.035

-.057

-.001

-.044

Authorization
for Use of Open
Hand
Techniques

.052

.042

.014

-.049

Authorization
for Use of
Closed Hand
Techniques

-.060

-.016

-.148

-.062

Authorization
for Use of Leg

.203**

.191**

.141

-.112
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Hobble
Techniques
Dedicated
Personnel for
Special
Operations

.046

-.004

Number of
.069
.081
Specialized
Units Within
Agency
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001

.100

.036

.109

.105

Jurisdiction-level characteristics. Table 3 provides Pearson’s r values for all correlations
between jurisdiction-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy and protest
management strategies. At the jurisdiction-level, there is only one variable related to the
adoption of tactics advocated by the IACP model policy .and alignment with use of negotiated
management tactics. Agencies located in the Northeast are less likely to comply with the IACP’s
recommended practices (r = -.163, p < .10) or adopt negotiated management tactics (r = -.197, p
< .05).
Three jurisdiction-level variables are related to command and control strategy adoption.
First, there is a weak relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rate (per 100,000
population) and an agency’s reliance on command and control practices (r = .194, p < .05). This
finding indicates that as the violent crime rate increases in a jurisdiction, the agency is more likely
to adopt command and control tactics. Further, this study finds that when the population increases,
the adoption of command and control practices increase as well (r = .196, p < .05). This finding
implies that police serving larger populations may be more restrictive during protests. Reliance on
command and control tactics may also be attributed to jurisdictional-level diversity. As the
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percentage of black residents increases, so does reliance on command and control practices (r =
.221, p < .05).
Finally, Pearson’s r correlation reveals a relationship between two jurisdiction-level
characteristics and the adoption of escalated force tactics. First, there is a moderate relationship
between percentage of black residents and reliance on escalated force practices (r = .227, p < .05).
This finding indicates that as the percentage of black community residents increases, so does the
adoption of escalated force tactics. Additionally, agencies in the Western United States adopt fewer
escalated force tactics (r = .-.161, p < .10), while agencies in the South utilize more of these
practices (r = .164, p < .10). This finding supports research that suggests there are regional
differences in policing styles (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011).
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Table 3: Jurisdiction-Level Correlations
Variable

IACP
Compliance

Negotiated
Management

Violent Crime
.141
.126
Rate (per
100,000)
Unemployment
.139
.056
Rate, by
Jurisdiction
Population Size,
.096
.030
by Jurisdiction
Percent of High
.002
.066
School
Graduates, by
Jurisdiction
Poverty Level,
.081
.085
by Jurisdiction
Percent Black,
.089
.036
by Jurisdiction
West Region
.097
.084
Midwest Region
-.031
-.018
South Region
.089
.116
Northeast
-.163*
-.197**
Region
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001

Command and
Control

Escalated Force

.194**

.129

.155*

-.033

.196**

-.008

-.084

-.076

.058

-.055

.221**

.227**

.032
-.102
.122
-.083

-.161*
-.060
.164*
.008

Linear Regression Models
Following the examination of Pearson’s r correlations, the data are also examined with
linear regression models. This study is an exploratory study and the first of its kind to examine
current policies and how they align with those recommended by the IACP model policy and
existing protest management strategies. There is little theory, beyond the few research studies
cited, to suggest which agency or jurisdictional-level variables might be associated with model
policy adoption or the use of a particular protest strategy. When linear regression is used to
explore the data, few models in this study are statistically significant. The adjusted R-Squared for
many of the models is negative, which indicates that the proposed models do not explain
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dependent variable variance (i.e. IACP model policy compliance, or adoption of negotiated
management, command and control, or escalated force tactics). Nonetheless, insignificant
findings and lack of explanatory power provides important findings for future analysis and
theory building. As such, this dissertation will highlight any statistically significant findings, and
present general models that do not yield significant results. To begin, two types of agency-level
regression models are presented. The first includes administrative-related agency-level variables
(i.e., agency size, diversity, education, and funding spent on militarized equipment). The second
includes correlates found in previous research that should, theoretically, be related to the
adoption of particular protest management tactics.
Agency-level regression models: Administration focused. The regression model
examining the relationship between agency-level variables on IACP model policy compliance is
not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is slightly negative, indicating that no
variance is explained within the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no significant
predictors in the model to explain adoption of IACP’s recommended practices. Table 4 provides
all the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting compliance with the IACP model
policy.
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Table 4: Agency-Level Regression Model for IACP Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
.000

SE B

Standardized
Β
.178

Significance
Level
.177

.037

.816

-.039

.811

.178

.162

-.082

.516

Number of
.000
Full-Time
Sworn
Personnel
Percent Black,
.031
.134
by Agency
Percent
-.021
.087
Minority, by
Agency
Percent
.119
.084
Bachelor’s
Degree, by
Agency
Militarized
.000
.001
Equipment Cost
by Officer
Adj. R2=-.006, p = .472, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

The regression model predicting the adoption of negotiated management tactics based on
agency-level variables is also not statistically significant. However, the Adjusted R-Squared is
positive and explains about four percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This model
includes one significant predictor; agencies with higher educational attainment are more likely to
adopt negotiated management practices (p < .05). Table 5 provides the model statistics for
agency-level variables predicting alignment with the negotiated management strategy.
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Table 5: Agency-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
6.724 E-5

SE B

Standardized
Β
.067

Number of
.000
Full-Time
Sworn
Personnel
Percent Black,
.013
.060
.033
by Agency
Percent
.007
.039
.027
Minority, by
Agency
Percent
.095
.038
.311**
Bachelor’s
Degree, by
Agency
Militarized
.000
.000
-.086
Equipment Cost
by Officer
Adj. R2=-.049, p = .605, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Significance
Level
.603

.830
.865

.014

.485

The model predicting the adoption of command and control tactics with agency-level
characteristics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is also negative. Like the
previous model, there is one significant predictor of the use of command and control tactics.
Larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and control practices during protests (p <
.10). Table 6 provides the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting alignment with
the command and control strategy.
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Table 6: Agency-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
.000

SE B

Standardized
Β
.230*

Significance
Level
.084

.046

.775

-.027

.869

.027

.832

-.038

.765

Number of
.000
Full-Time
Sworn
Personnel
Percent Black,
.013
.045
by Agency
Percent
-.005
.029
Minority, by
Agency
Percent
.006
.028
Bachelor’s
Degree, by
Agency
Militarized
7.602 E-5
.000
Equipment Cost
by Officer
Adj. R2=-.020, p = .596, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Finally, the model using agency-level characteristics to predict the adoption of escalated
force tactics is not statistically significant, but the Adjusted R-Squared is slightly positive,
accounting for about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Unfortunately, there
are no statistically significant predictors within this model. Table 7 provides the model statistics
for agency-level variables predicting alignment with the escalated force strategy.
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Table 7: Agency-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
-6.919 E-5

SE B

Standardized
Β
-.143

Significance
Level
.271

.214

.175

.069

.670

.163

.193

-.003

.980

Number of
.000
Full-Time
Sworn
Personnel
Percent Black,
.040
.029
by Agency
Percent
.008
.019
Minority, by
Agency
Percent
.024
.018
Bachelor’s
Degree, by
Agency
Militarized
-4.176 E-6
.000
Equipment Cost
by Officer
Adj. R2= .021, p = .283, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Research-based regression models. The models in this section are driven by previous
research findings. Variables included in these agency-level models differ based on the dependent
variable. For instance, community-oriented policing variables are used to assess the association
with the adoption of negotiated management strategies. To examine the adoption of command
and control tactics, variables relating to the use and number of specialized units are included in
the model. Finally, use of force variables included in the LEMAS dataset are integrated used to
predict adoption of escalated force tactics.
First, the community-oriented policing model used to predict the adoption of negotiated
management tactics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Squared is negative,
indicating that no variance is explained in the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no
significant predictors within this model, which implies that the measures of community-oriented
policing may not truly represent this concept, or that negotiated management may not be
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theoretically driven by agencies that embrace community-oriented policing, as previously
suggested. Table 8 provides the model statistics examining the relationship between communityoriented agency-level variables and the adoption of negotiated management tactics.

Table 8: Community-Oriented Policing Model for Negotiated Management
Variable

Unstandardized
b
-1.845

SE B

Standardized
Β
-.140

Significance
Level
.203

.014

.896

.113

.343

-.009

.938

.127

.236

Recruit
1.438
Training on
C.O.P.
Current Officer
.130
.996
Training on
C.O.P.
Whether
1.846
1.936
Officers Are
Responsible
For Same Beat
Percent of
-.002
.022
Agency
Responsible
For Same Beat
Information
1.175
.985
Utilized From
Community
Survey
Adj. R2=-.013, p = .580, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

The next model examines the relationship between specialized units and an agency’s
adoption of command and control practices. This model is not statistically significant and the
Adjusted R-Squared does not explain dependent variable variance. Additionally, there are no
significant predictors in the model. This finding implies that agency use of specialized units may
not influence the use of command and control strategies. Table 9 provides the model statistics
examining the relationship between specialized unit agency-level variables and the adoption of
command and control tactics.
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Table 9: Specialized Unit Model for Command and Control Reliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
1.263

SE B

Standardized
Β
.098

Significance
Level
.307

.096

.317

Whether
1.231
Agency Has
Dedicated
Personnel for
Special
Operations
Number of
.019
.018
Specialized
Units in the
Agency
Adj. R2= .003, p = .310, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

The final model is presented in Table 10. The model assesses the correlation between use
of force policies and the adoption of escalated force tactics. This model is not significant and the
Adjusted R-Squared indicates that no dependent variable variance is explained by the model.
There is one predictor that is on the verge of being statistically significant. Agencies who
authorize all officers to use impact weapons are more likely to adopt escalated force strategies (p
= .109). Although insignificant, the current study’s small sample size reduces the power of the
current analysis. The influence of officer authorization to use impact weapons on escalated force
strategy adoption might prove important in future studies based on larger samples.
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Table 10: Use of Force Model for Escalated Force Reliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
-2.529

SE B

Standardized
Β
-.149

Significance
Level
.147

.166

.1094

-.139

.176

-.053

.600

-.076

.465

-.022

.829

.074

.541

-.020

.862

-.071

.486

Authorization
1.729
for Use of
Batons
Authorization
.748
.463
for Use of
Impact
Weapons
Authorization
-.851
.626
for Use of Soft
Projectiles
Authorization
-.238
.452
for Use of
Chemical
Agents
Authorization
-.552
.752
for Use of
Tasers
Authorization
-.116
.535
for Use of Neck
Restraints
Authorization
.896
1.460
for Use of Open
Hand
Techniques
Authorization
-.147
.846
for Use of
Closed Hand
Techniques
Authorization
-.351
.502
for Use of Leg
Hobble
Techniques
Adj. R2= -.007, p = .514, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Jurisdiction-level regression models. The data are examined using linear regression to
assess the relationship between jurisdiction-level characteristics with IACP model policy

4

When rounding, this finding falls just outside the range of rejecting the null hypothesis. As
such, I will leave it up to the discretion of the reader as to how to interpret this finding.
75

compliance and reliance on particular protest management strategies. The first model, regressing
IACP compliance on jurisdiction-level characteristics, is not statistically significant and only
explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. As presented in Table 11,
there is only one significant predictor of overall IACP model policy compliance. Agencies located
in the Western region of the United States are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the
IACP model policy (p < .10). This finding could be due to the fact that many of the agencies in the
Western region of the United States contract out their policy construction to private agencies (e.g.,
Lexipol). Eagly & Schwartz (2018) contend that 95% of police agencies in California rely on
policy manuals constructed by Lexipol. These agencies seem to align with the basic principles
recommended by the IACP at face value. As such, it is likely that these agencies, hiring private
organizations, are less likely to deviate from industry-recommended practices.
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Table 11: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model of IACP Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
SE B
Standardized
b
Β
Population Size,
1.255E-6
.000
.125
by Jurisdiction
Percent of High
.231
.156
.155
School
Graduates, by
Jurisdiction
Unemployment
.421
.477
.100
Rate, by
Jurisdiction
Poverty Level,
.116
.194
.063
by Jurisdiction
Percent Black,
.038
.079
.061
by Jurisdiction
Violent Crime
.001
.003
.044
Rate (Per
100,000)
West
17.670
9.853
.803*
Midwest
13.722
9.969
.464
South
15.353
9.739
.783
Northeast
11.011
9.840
.448
2
Adj. R = .027, p = .231, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Significance
Level
.203
.141

.380

.552
.628
.697

.076
.172
.118
.266

Unfortunately, the findings for each of the strategy management models are similar to those
of the general IACP compliance model. The negotiated management model is not statistically
significant and only explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table
12 shows that there is only one significant predictor in this model. Jurisdictions with higher levels
of high school graduates are more likely to follow the principles of negotiated management (p <
.10).
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Table 12: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
SE B
Standardized
b
Β
Population Size,
3.347 E-7
.000
.074
by Jurisdiction
Percent of High
.127
.070
.189*
School
Graduates, by
Jurisdiction
Unemployment
.053
.216
.028
Rate, by
Jurisdiction
Poverty Level,
.081
.088
.097
by Jurisdiction
Percent Black,
.001
.036
.002
by Jurisdiction
Violent Crime
.001
.001
.077
Rate (Per
100,000)
West
6.639
4.460
.667
Midwest
5.139
4.513
.385
South
5.917
4.409
.668
Northeast
3.511
4.455
.316
2
Adj. R = .024, p = .250, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Significance
Level
.453
.074

.807

.357
.987
.500

.140
.257
.183
.432

The command and control model is also not significant and only explains about four
percent of the dependent variable variance. Table 13 shows that those agencies policing larger
jurisdictions are more likely to rely on command and control tactics (p < .10). Like the correlations
explained earlier, larger populations signify more people on the streets for routine activities. When
protests occur, higher population densities and interactions may increase the chance of community
disruption during routine activities. Risks associated with increased interactions in larger
jurisdictions may explain why these agencies rely on more restrictive practices.
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Table 13: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
SE B
Standardized
b
Β
Population Size,
5.945 E-7
.000
.185*
by Jurisdiction
Percent of High
.032
.049
.067
School
Graduates, by
Jurisdiction
Unemployment
.095
.152
.071
Rate, by
Jurisdiction
Poverty Level,
.007
.062
.011
by Jurisdiction
Percent Black,
.039
.025
.195
by Jurisdiction
Violent Crime
.000
.001
.055
Rate (Per
100,000)
West
3.789
3.129
.538
Midwest
2.129
3.166
.225
South
3.172
3.093
.505
Northeast
2.451
3.125
.312
2
Adj. R = .043, p = .144, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Significance
Level
.059
.523

.531

.913
.122
.625

.229
.503
.307
.435

Finally, the escalated force model reveals no significance and the model explains about
two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table 14 reveals that there are no
significant predictors in this model. As such, this study finds that the jurisdiction-level variables
selected for this analysis cannot be used to predict the adoption of escalated force tactics.
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Table 14: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance
Variable

Unstandardized
b
1.585 E-7

SE B

Standardized
Β
-.068

Significance
Level
.488

-.101

.339

-.101

.381

-.111

.296

.189

.139

.100

.384

-.418
-.313
-.359
-.276

.355
.359
.474
.495

Population Size,
.000
by Jurisdiction
Percent of High
-.035
.036
School
Graduates, by
Jurisdiction
Unemployment
-.097
.111
Rate, by
Jurisdiction
Poverty Level,
-.048
.045
by Jurisdiction
Percent Black,
.027
.018
by Jurisdiction
Violent Crime
.001
.001
Rate (Per
100,000)
West
-2.128
2.290
Midwest
-2.137
2.317
South
-1.625
2.264
Northeast
-1.567
2.287
Adj. R2= .016, p = .311, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Summary
This study provides an exploratory and cursory examination of protest management
tactics and alignment with a model policy and particular management themes. To help guide
future police protest management research and theory, the significant bivariate correlations and
linear regression model findings are reiterated and briefly discussed. This summary begins with
findings related to overall model policy compliance, followed by findings associated with each
of the three protest management strategy themes.
IACP model policy compliance. First, Pearson’s r correlations reveal significant
relationships with multiple agency-level and a single jurisdiction-level characteristic. Larger
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agencies tend to rely more on practices advocated by the IACP model policy (r = .153, p < .10).
These agencies typically have more resources (Carter & Carter, 2009) and are able to use these
resources to include community input in their policies (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Eagly & Schwartz,
2018). This input is essential for police to employ legitimate tactics (Sadusky, 2001).
Community input is the cornerstone of community policing, which has potential to improve
police-community relations (Bazemore & Schiff, 2015). Diversity within police agencies is also
advocated by proponents of community policing. This study finds that agencies with more
minority officers are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP (r = .188, p <
.05). This diversity is discussed in research as a way for agencies to be more representative of the
populations that they police (Skogan, 2004), thus reducing tensions between officers and
community residents. Like other variables representative of community policing, agencies
utilizing information from community surveys are more likely to adopt practices recommended
by the IACP (r = .162, p < .10). Each of these findings suggests that agencies that adhere to
community policing principles also demonstrate greater compliance with the IACP model policy.
Although it is preferable for police to avoid conflict with protestors, it is important to
have contingencies in place for interactions that necessitate use of force. Agencies who authorize
all of their officers to use soft projectiles (r = .182, p < .10), chemical agents (r = .180, p < .10),
and leg hobbling techniques (r = .203, p < .05) also tend to adopt practices advocated by the
IACP. Restrictions on the use of physical force, as mentioned previously, are likely to follow
mass authorization for officers to employ this type of force. Finally, bivariate correlations also
reveal that agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt IACP
recommended tactics (r = -.163, p < .10). After examining the data, there are no differences
between variables that were found to be statistically significant for all sample agencies and those
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within the Northeastern United States. However, it is unlikely that region alone can explain the
differences in the adoption of IACP recommended practices and those that align with negotiated
management. As such, future research should examine the relationship between additional
agency- and jurisdiction-level and the adoption of these tactics. Conversely, the jurisdictionlevel regression model predicting IACP compliance signifies that agencies in the Western United
States are more likely to utilize tactics the IACP promotes as best practice (B = .803, p < .10).
This finding suggests that there is regional variation in the degree of compliance with the IACP’s
model policy on crowd management and control. Table 15 presents all significant factors
associated with IACP model policy compliance.

Table 15: Factors Associated with IACP Model Policy Compliance
Bivariate Correlations
Variable
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel
Percent Minority, by Agency
Utilized information from community survey
Authorization for use of soft projectiles
Authorization for use of chemical agents
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques
Northeast Region
Regression Model Variables
Variable
West Region
* p < .10, ** p < .05

r
.153*
.188**
.162*
.182*
.180*
.203**
-.163*
B
.803*

Negotiated management strategy. In addition to assessing the correlation between
agency- and jurisdiction-level variables with IACP compliance, the relationship between each of
these variables and existing protest management strategies is also examined. Bivariate
correlations indicate that agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment are more
likely to adopt negotiated management practices (r = .229, p < .05). This finding highlights the
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potential benefits of an educated police force. Like the IACP compliance models, this finding
suggests that some aspects of community policing may be inherently linked with negotiated
management tactics. This is reinforced by the finding that agencies utilizing information from
community surveys are also more likely to adopt tactics representative of negotiated
management (r = .158, p < .10). Also similar to the IACP compliance models, use of force
variables show significance. Agencies authorizing all of their officers to utilize chemical agents
(r = .210, p < .05) and leg hobbling techniques (r = .191, p < .05) are more likely to employ
negotiated management practices during a protest. Finally, like overall IACP model compliance,
agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt negotiated management
practices (r = -.197, p < .05). Existing theory and research do not provide insight into
explanations for the relationships between use of force policies and negotiated management, or
why Northeastern police agencies might be less likely to employ negotiated management
strategies.
The regression models for negotiated management tactics reveal two important findings.
First, agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment rely more on negotiated
management practices (p < .10). Second, agencies policing jurisdictions with more high school
graduates are also more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics (p < .10). In previous
research, contacting and building relationships with protest leaders has been discussed as an
important police responsibility (King, 2013). However, these relationships can only be built and
thrive when both parties are willing to cooperate. This finding seems to indicate that education is
an important factor in negotiated management for both police and community members. Table
16 presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the negotiated
management strategy.
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Table 16: Factors Associated with Negotiated Management Strategy
Bivariate Correlations
Variable
Percent Bachelor’s Degree, by Agency
Utilized information from community survey
Authorization for use of chemical agents
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques
Northeast Region
Regression Model Variables
Variable
Percent Bachelor’s Degree, by Agency
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction
* p < .10, ** p < .05

R
.229**
.158*
.210**
.191**
-.197**
B
.311**
.189*

Command and control strategy. Adoption of command and control tactics is
significantly associated with nine variables and predicted by two agency- and jurisdiction-level
variables. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt tactics aligning with command and
control (r = .223, p < .05). As mentioned previously, larger agencies have more resources at their
disposal (Carter & Carter, 2009). As such, these resources may be allocated toward the purchase
of equipment used for spatial containment (e.g. barricades, shields, etc.). Diversity of the agency
also matters, as agencies with more black (r = .225, p < .05) and minority officers (r = .225, p <
.05) are more likely to align with command and control strategies. Like previous models,
agencies employing information from community surveys were more likely to adopt command
and control practices (r = .205, p < .05). These findings indicate that agencies focused on
community policing strategies may be more likely to adopt command and control strategies, as
well. Additionally, agencies authorizing officers to use chemical agents were more likely to
adopt tactics relating to command and control (r = .173, p < .10). Chemical agents are typically
employed in conjunction with the use of command and control strategies (Vitale, 2005). These
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tactics are commonly utilized to disperse problematic crowds, that have previously been
subjected to spatial containment.
While several of the same agency-level variables were associated with IACP model
policy and negotiated management compliance, jurisdiction-level characteristics seem to differ
with respect to the adoption of command and control tactics. For instance, agencies policing
areas with higher violent crime rates tend to rely more on command and control practices (r =
.194, p < .05). Additionally, those areas with higher unemployment rates utilize these tactics
more often (r = .155, p < .10). According to Harcourt’s (1998; 2001) strict enforcement
approach, these areas may be targeted by perceived discriminatory tactics, leading to a heavier
reliance on restrictive measures. Agencies policing larger jurisdictions also tend to rely more on
these practices (r = .196, p < .05). Finally, jurisdictions with a higher proportion of black
residents are more likely to adopt command and control tactics (r = .221, p < .05). While beyond
the scope of this dissertation, future researchers may want to examine the extent to which racial
threat theory (Blalock, 1967) could be used to explain these relationships.
The regression model examining the relationship between jurisdictional characteristics
and reliance on command and control signifies that larger agencies (B = .230, p < .10) policing
larger jurisdictions (B = .185, p < .10) are more likely to adopt these practices. A potential
explanation was discussed previously; larger populations lead to more interactions within the
course of routine activities. As such, police may rely on these practices to minimize community
disruption during protests. Table 17 presents all significant factors associated with agency
adherence to the command and control strategy.
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Table 17: Factors Associated with Command and Control Strategy
Bivariate Correlations
Variable
Number of full-time sworn personnel
Percent black, by Agency
Percent minority, by Agency
Utilized information from community survey
Authorization for use of chemical agents
Violent crime rate, by Jurisdiction
Unemployment rate, by Jurisdiction
Population size, by Jurisdiction
Percent black, by Jurisdiction
Regression Model Variables
Variable
Number of full-time sworn personnel
Population size, by Jurisdiction
* p < .10, ** p < .05

R
.223**
.225**
.225**
.205**
.173*
.194**
.155*
.196**
.221**
B
.230*
.185*

Escalated force strategy. Pearson’s r correlations reveal four significant bivariate
relationships and one predictor approaching significance associated with police adoption of
escalated force tactics. Agencies authorizing the use of soft projectiles are less likely to rely on
escalated force tactics (r = -.160, p < .10). This finding indicates that not all agencies within the
sample that authorize impact munitions place restrictions on their use. Theoretically, those
agencies that do not stipulate that impact weapons should not be fired indiscriminately into the
crowd align with the escalated force model (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998;
Schweingruber, 2000). Additionally, agencies policing jurisdictions with more black community
members tend to rely more on the use of escalated force practices (r = .227, p < .05). Like
command and control, racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) may also be used to explain why
escalated force tactics are more likely to be used to manage protests in jurisdictions with larger
proportions of black residents. Finally, while agencies in the Western United States are less
likely to adopt escalated force tactics (r = -.161, p < .10), those in the South adopt these practices
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more often (r = .164, p < .10). Once again, findings suggest that there is regional variation in
police protest management strategies.
The model testing the correlations with agency-level characteristics and reliance on escalated
force tactics indicates that those agencies authorizing the use of impact weapons were more
likely to align with escalated force practices (B = .109, p = .109). Although just short of reaching
significance at the p = .10 level, this finding deserves further researcher attention. Impact
weapons are often used for crowd dispersal. Since escalated force strategies focus on means of
crowd dispersal, it follows that there is a relationship between these two variables. Table 18
presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the escalated force strategy.

Table 18: Factors Associated with Escalated Force Strategy
Bivariate Correlations
Variable
Authorization for use of soft projectiles
Percent black, by Jurisdiction
West Region
South Region
Regression Model Variables
Variable
Authorization for use of impact weapons
p = .109 t, * p < .10, ** p < .05

r
-.160*
.227**
-.161*
.164*
B
.109t
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines three specific research questions governing the use of police
protest management tactics in the United States. The research questions examined in this study
assess the degree of policy compliance by police agencies with recommended IACP practices,
the use of tactics aligning with the three existing protest management tactics, as well as the
relationship between agency-/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the use of these tactics. This
chapter begins with a brief discussion of the overall findings from this study. This discussion
interprets and emphasizes how previous research relates to this dissertation’s findings. The
discussion concludes by considering how the associations between agency-/jurisdiction-level
characteristics and the use of strategy tactics align with three major topics: community-oriented
policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional variation.
This section also describes the strengths and limitations, as well as the implications of the
current study. The implications into two sections. First, policy implications are offered to explain
how this study may impact the field of policing. Second, directions for research are considered,
and special attention is given to how the assumptions made in this study point to future avenues
for research on protest violence. Finally, this dissertation concludes with final thoughts on the
significance of the current work and how this study expands upon existing knowledge.
Discussion
This study attempts to identify current protest management practices and strategies used
by police agencies across the United States. It is the first study that seeks to determine the degree
to which these policies differ from each other, as well as from policies considered to represent
best practices within the policing field. Police influence on protest outcomes, including violence,
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has been established by research since the 1970’s (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973).
Research has also deeply explored various theoretical frameworks of protest management
strategies (Bourne, 2011; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale,
2005). To date, these strategies have been presented as fitting neatly across a historical timeline,
with one strategy replacing another as new strategies emerge. This study questions the accuracy
of this sequential presentation of strategy adoption and replacement. It is the first systematic
documentation of current U.S. police protest management policies that demonstrates the degree
to which agencies rely on a variety of management tactics. This dissertation reports the degree to
which a sample of agencies adhere to best practice standards, and reveals that these agencies use
tactics that stem from three different management strategies.
Protest management has historically been a controversial aspect of policing. Many police
crowd management tactics have been questioned by scholars and the public. The complexities of
demonstration management contribute to on-going dialog about the need to improve policing
practices with regard to crowd management and control. Managing protest crowds requires that
attention be given to several potentially competing priorities, including preserving constitutional
rights, preventing crowd violence, and ensuring officer and societal safety. Police face the unique
challenge of balancing each of these goals without sacrificing one to achieve another.
The methods employed within this study emulate those used by Lum & Fachner (2008) to
study agency policies governing police pursuits. Like Lum & Fachner, this study uses an IACP
model policy as a focal point from which to compare existing agency policies. The IACP model
policy on crowd management and control was subjected to a content analysis. This analysis was
then used to identify tactics promoted by the IACP as best practice, and a 45-item coding
instrument was created. Dichotomous items were used to assess agency policy adherence to the
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IACP’s recommendations concerning the use of specific tactics. The data are described and
analyzed using descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and linear regression models in an
attempt to answer three specific research questions. The findings of this study will be discussed
in relation to each of these research questions.
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a
sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices advocated by the IACP model
policy on crowd management and control?
While the data were examined using a variety of statistical analyses, (univariate,
bivariate, and multivariate), arguably, the most impactful findings stem from basic descriptive
statistics that reveal the degree to which existing police policies adhere to tactics recommended
by the IACP and to three different protest management strategies. These findings identify
differences among the specific tactics used by a sample of U.S. police agencies to manage
protests.
Overall, U.S. police agency policies show relatively low compliance with the tactics
IACP promotes as best practice. The average agency policy adheres to about one-third of 45
tactics identified within the IACP model policy (31.1%). The most frequently adopted practices
within this sample align with the escalated force model of protest management (53.3%). As such,
many of the sample agencies provide guidance on the use of force during civil disturbances.
While policy statements governing the use of escalated force tactics are the most common within
this sample, command and control tactics are only implemented half as often (26.7%). Command
and control tactics relate to the use of spatial containment and constraining the time, place, and
manner of protests (Vitale, 2005). On average, agencies adopt about one-third (33.3%) of
negotiated management tactics examined in this study. Negotiated management advocates the

90

use of planning and dialog to facilitate First Amendment rights for participants while
maintaining public safety (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Overall, police agencies
appear most concerned with providing guidance on use of force during protests, should force
become necessary. Following this, policies promote tactics to facilitate peaceful and lawful
assemblies. Finally, and least frequently, policies emphasize the restriction of protest activities to
minimize community disruption.
Another research question in this study is designed to assess differences between
agencies with high and low model policy compliance. However, given the relatively small
sample used in this study, it may be useful to provide context around those agencies with the
highest and those with the lowest compliance scores. Only one of the 117 sample agencies
complies with all 45 IACP model policy recommendations. Interestingly, this agency has a
history of protest violence and other violent crowd events (e.g. sporting event riots). These past
events might have served as the impetus for the police agency to adopt best practice protest
management techniques promoted by the IACP. This agency faced the challenge of shifting
community perceptions of the agency, and media reports indicate that the agency aimed to
reduce police use of force while managing crowds. The Chief of this department, as cited in a
2015 news article, stated that the agency’s use of new protest management tactics resulted from
the agency’s adoption of constitutional policing.
Constitutional policing is derived from Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute § 14141,
which states that police shall behave in a lawful manner without infringing upon individual
constitutional rights (United States Department of Justice, 2017). Fyfe (2004) contends that this
statute holds officers accountable for their decisions and ensures that officers behave in an
appropriate manner. This strategy is heavily linked with constitutional issues relating to search
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and seizures (Fyfe, 2004; Rushin & Edwards, 2017). However, the focus of this strategy extends
beyond this issue into other policing activities, including the management of crowds and
protests.
As stated previously, in policing, there has been a recent emphasis on preserving
constitutional rights during protests. The adoption of constitutional policing has emerged in
many agencies for protest management, including the agency that has the greatest level of
compliance with IACP recommendations. Protecting individual rights during violent protests can
prove quite difficult. The challenge becomes safeguarding law-abiding participant rights, while
ensuring the safety of officers and society as a whole. While some see police use of force during
protests as an inherent violation of constitutional rights, there are times that force is necessary to
ensure the protection of both the public and police.
The high-profile nature of controversial use of force incidents has led many agencies to
adopt constitutional policing as part of their overall mission. One primary impetus, the shooting
of Michael Brown by a Ferguson police officer in August 2014, triggered an investigation into
Ferguson Police Department’s practices (Dukanovic, 2016). The Department of Justice (DOJ)
released a report of their findings in a document commonly referred to as The Ferguson Report.
This report highlighted the need for police agencies to embrace fair and impartial practices.
Findings suggested a history of police conduct that disproportionately targeted black community
residents (United States Department of Justice, 2015). According to this report, black residents
accounted for 67% of Ferguson’s population, but they were subject to 93% of arrests from 2012
to 2014. The DOJ suggested that this outcome was at least partially the result of police
prioritizing revenue generation through citations, instead of public safety.
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Many researchers have also examined perceived discriminatory practices when assessing
protest management and outcomes. Police are not solely blamed for perceived discriminatory
practices during protests. For example, research suggests that the media inaccurately portrays
black demonstrators as being more violent than others (Rickford, 2016). This research, along
with others highlighted in the current study, including the Ferguson Report, seems to have
served as catalysts in the adoption of constitutional policing nationwide.
The agency with the second highest model policy compliance score adopted 43 of the 45
practices recommended by the IACP. The two tactics that were not adopted by this agency were
the provisions to use batons and barricades/police lines for spatial containment. Interestingly,
both of these tactics align with command and control strategies. There were multiple similarities
between the agency with a perfect IACP model policy compliance score and this agency. For
instance, both agencies were above the median for the percentage of officers with bachelor’s
degrees. Additionally, these agencies served poorer jurisdictions, housing more residents below
the poverty line. Finally, both agencies authorized all of their officers to employ leg-hobbling
techniques. This last finding deserves further examination. It may be that agencies who are likely
to face numerous violent protests are more likely to adopt best practices, which explains the high
degree of compliance, as well as providing officers a wide-range of options for dealing with
violent offenders, including permitting various forms of restraint.
In contrast to those with the highest compliance scores, two agency policies do not
adhere to any of the practices advocated by the IACP model policy. These low-scoring agencies
also share interesting similarities. Both of these agencies employ fewer officers with bachelor’s
degrees and typically serve populations housing residents above the poverty line. Additionally,
neither of these agencies authorize officers to use leg-hobbling techniques. Interestingly, these
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agency characteristics are completely divergent from the characteristics of the two agencies with
the highest level of model policy compliance. This may indicate that each of these variables
(officer education, jurisdictional poverty level, and use of specific restraints) have important
implications for adoption of best practices in protest management. This represents a potential
avenue for future research.
One agency with a protest management policy that does not adhere to any of the IACP
model policy recommendations presents an especially unique case. Of interest is this agency’s
geographic proximity to a location that experienced a significant incident of civil unrest. Given
the high-profile protests that occurred in this area, the lack of compliance with the IACP model
policy is noteworthy. One distinctive difference between agencies with higher compliance scores
and this agency is the adoption of body-worn cameras (BWC’s). Both of the agencies with the
highest compliance scores have utilized BWC’s for a number of years. The agency that
experienced significant civil unrest and does not comply with any of IACP recommended tactics
measured in this study, has not adopted this technology. According to recent news articles, the
jurisdiction’s council recently voted to require BWCs for all officers in mid-2019. Media reports
suggest that the delay in implementing this technology was due to the vast data storage costs
associated with BWCs.
BWCs have become increasingly popular within recent years due to calls for increased
transparency and accountability of police practices (Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & Snyder, 2016;
Taylor, 2016). While adoption of BWCs has increased, researchers and others continue to call
attention to privacy and surveillance concerns (Simmons, 2014; Sousa, Miethe, & Sakiyama,
2017). Still, some research shows that use of force incidents decrease significantly when officers
are required to wear BWCs (e.g., Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015). To date, the impact of BWC
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adoption on police policy changes has not been studied. As such, the adoption (or failure to
adopt) BWC technology may help us to understand why and when shifts in protest policies
occur. This also represents a future avenue for policy- and protest-related research.
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e.,
negotiated management, command and control, and escalated force) identified within
the IACP model policy?
In addition to measuring agency policy degree of compliance with the IACP model
policy on crowd management and control, this study also examines the degree of alignment with
three specific protest management strategies. The sample agency policies vary greatly, and
current findings indicate that agencies typically adopt practices stemming from each of the
protest management strategies, rather than aligning with one specific strategy. The following
sections discuss agency alignment with each of these strategies in detail.
Alignment with Negotiated Management
On average, agencies align with about one-third (33.3%) of the tactics representing the
use of negotiated management. This strategy promotes tactics focused on planning for lawful
assemblies and the use of police-protestor dialog to problem solve during demonstrations. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the most commonly adopted negotiated management tactics
include using the ICS/NIMS protocol for planning (79.5%), requiring verbal warnings before
resorting to physical dispersal tactics (53.9%), providing contingencies for additional personnel
(51.3%), requiring a neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), and providing directives for
spontaneous civil disturbances (48.7%). Agencies within this sample with high levels of
negotiated management alignment place importance on planning for lawful assemblies and
promoting dialog in order to effectively manage protests and avoid use of force incidents.
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According to the negotiated management approach, the ultimate goal is avoidance of use of force
(King, 2013). However, training in this approach requires police to know how to appropriately
identify the contexts in which dialog will be effective and when use of force is necessary
(Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).
There are three agency crowd management policies that align with all 15 items used to
measure compliance with the negotiated management strategy. Since these items were drawn
from the same instrument that measured compliance with the IACP model policy, it is
unsurprising that two of these agencies are also the agencies with the highest degree of model
policy compliance. The three agencies with perfect negotiated management compliance all
employ officers with higher educational attainment and authorize all of their sworn personnel to
employ chemical agents. The agency with perfect negotiated management compliance but not
one of the top two with regard to IACP model compliance (i.e., scoring 33 out of 45) is also
unique in its own way. This agency serves a well-educated jurisdiction and has a well-educated
police force, with 98% of residents graduating high school and about one-quarter of officers
holding higher education degrees. However, neither the jurisdiction nor the agency is very
diverse, reporting populations of 1.8% non-white residents and 1.8% non-white officers. While
there is little diversity within the police department, it can be said that the agency is truly
representative of its population.
Conversely, there are 12 agencies with policies that do not contain any of the measured
negotiated management tactics. Half of these agencies employ officers with lower educational
attainment and do not authorize officers to utilize chemical agents. These findings indicate that
education and permission to use chemical agents may be important in understanding negotiated
management strategy adoption among agencies. Nine of the 12 agencies that do not require
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negotiated management tactics to manage protests employ fewer minority officers than are
constituted within the community, thus leading to a sense of underrepresentation within these
agencies. This finding may imply that agencies that better reflect the populations they serve may
also be more likely to adopt negotiated management practices.
Alignment with Command and Control
In general, agency policy alignment is lower for command and control tactics than
negotiated management. On average, agencies align with about one-quarter (26.7%) of the 15
measured command and control tactics. These tactics focus on the restriction of time, place, and
manner of protest activities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the more frequently adopted
command and control tactics are implementing specialized units for crowd dispersal (62.4%),
required perimeters for civil disturbances (58.1%), temporary detention areas following mass
arrest (43.6%), prohibiting canines for crowd control (27.4%), and restricting bystanders from
entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Most command and control tactics relate to the use of spatial
containment to prevent additional participants from entering disturbance areas and removing
problematic individuals to stop further crowd incitement. The central aim of this strategy is to
prevent protests from disrupting routine activities in the community (Vitale, 2005).
There are two agencies with policies that aligned with 14 of 15 possible command and
control tactics. Both agencies had more specialized units than the average agency (median = 7
specialized units). Having more specialized units aligns with the command and control model, as
this strategy advocates for specialized training to manage protest crowds (Vitale, 2005).
Additionally, both of these agencies authorize all of their officers to use chemical agents, soft
projectiles, and impact weapons. These types of police use of force options also support the basic
tenets of command and control. These weapons are often used in conjunction with spatial
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containment techniques (Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). Finally, both of these agencies
utilize information from community surveys and provide in-depth training for new recruits on
community-oriented policing. One agency policy does not contain any tactics that align with the
command and control strategy. Unlike the two agencies with the highest command and control
alignment, this agency has fewer specialized units than the median; officers are not authorized to
use chemical agents, soft projectiles, or impact weapons; the agency does not use community
surveys for input; and community-oriented policing training is not provided for new recruits.
Alignment with Escalated Force
Agency policies are most aligned with the escalated force strategy. On average, agencies
within this sample aligned with about half (53.3%) of the 15 measured escalated force tactics.
Escalated force strategies rely on the use of force to disperse disorderly crowds (McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). The most commonly adopted
escalated force tactics within the sample agencies are restricting tear gas to appropriate situations
(79.5%), prohibiting Tasers for restraint purposes (66.7%), using aerosol spray only against those
engaging in unlawful behaviors (64.1%), allowing mass arrest during civil disturbances (56.4%),
and requiring arrest for those engaging in unlawful behavior (53.9%). Escalated force strategies
typically promote the use of less-lethal weapons and arrest to ensure crowd compliance
(McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000).
Two agencies have policies that align with 13 of 15 escalated force tactics. These two
agencies are both below the median for number of sworn personnel (median = 376). Both
agencies also have fewer specialized units than the average agency and provide extensive
community-oriented policing training to recruits in the academy. Additionally, both agencies
have percentages of minority (median = 16.86) and black officers (median = 7.76) that are above
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the median. Finally, the two agencies with the greatest degree of escalated force alignment also
authorize all officers to use soft projectiles and impact weapons. Conversely, the single agency
with the lowest level of escalated force alignment (i.e., 3 of 15 tactics) is above the median for
number of sworn officers and number of specialized units, but below the median for percentage
of minority and black officers. Additionally, this agency does not authorize all officers to use
soft projectiles, impact weapons, or provide community-oriented policing training to new
recruits. These findings suggest that differences in agency-level characteristics may be helpful in
explaining why escalated force tactics are (or are not) adopted.
3. Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of
compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?
While examining differences between agencies with the highest and lowest
compliance/alignment scores provides cursory insight into why agencies might adopt different
practices, the data in this study are also subjected to linear regression models to assess the
relationship between agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with the adoption of model
policy and strategy-specific tactics. The findings from the bivariate correlations and regression
models are presented in the findings section, but are now discussed in terms of three themes:
community-oriented policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences in
practices.
Community-Oriented Policing
This study examines the correlation between various community-oriented policing
variables and the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy, as well as the level of
alignment with the three existing protest management strategies. Variables in these models
include the educational attainment and level of diversity within an agency, as well as the extent
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to which agencies adopt and train recruits/officers in the use of community-oriented practices.
The findings from this study indicate that there is a relationship between community-oriented
policing and multiple protest management strategies employed in the United States. Agencies
employing more black (r = .225, p < .05) and minority (r = .225, p < .05) officers are more likely
to adopt command and control tactics. Those agencies with more minority officers (r = .188, p <
.05) are also more likely to employ tactics advocated by the IACP. Additionally, agencies with
higher educational attainment (r = .229, p < .05) are more likely to align with negotiated
management tactics. Finally, agencies that utilize information from community surveys are more
likely to comply with the IACP model policy (r = .162, p < .10), as well as align with negotiated
management practices (r = .158, p < .10) and command and control tactics (r = .205, p < .05).
Regression models indicate that agencies with more educated officers (B = .311, p < .05), serving
populations with higher educational attainment (B = .189, p < .10) are more likely to adopt
negotiated management tactics. The model testing the community-oriented policing training and
practice on the adoption of negotiated management tactics is not significant and does not reveal
any significant correlations.
While previous research attributes community-oriented policing to the development of
negotiated management tactics, this study finds mixed results. The variables used to represent
training of new recruits and current officers in community-oriented policing were not related to
the use of negotiated management tactics. This result was the same for variables representing the
adoption of community-oriented practices. However, these are not the only measures of
community policing in this study. Diversity, community involvement, and education seem to be
related to the use of negotiated management. Additionally, diversity and community involvement
are also related to the command and control strategy.
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Since the 1990’s, community-oriented policing has been one of the most widely adopted
U.S. policing strategies. Advocates of this approach contend that there are specific factors that
necessitate the success of community policing. For example, employing a diverse population is
advantageous to those agencies adopting community-oriented policing, as officers are able to
better represent the populations that they serve (Cordner & Scarborough, 1997). Recent studies
provide inconclusive results on the impact of agency diversity on both use of force (Alpert,
Dunham, & Mcdonald, 2004; Shjarback. Decker, Rojek, & Brunson, 2017; Todak, Huff &
James, 2018) and perceived police legitimacy (Ozkan, Worrall, & Piquero, 2016; Todak, Huff, &
James, 2018). However, diversifying agencies is advocated by many proponents of community
policing as a way to identify with and facilitate change in the community (Peak & Sousa, 2018).
This study indicates that agencies with more diversity are more likely to adopt practices
recommended by the IACP, which as mentioned previously, is largely related to providing
guidance on the use of force during protests. Additionally, the more diverse an agency, the more
likely they are to align with command and control strategies. This finding indicates that the level
of diversity within an agency may be more correlated with the adoption of restrictive practices,
than was previously realized.
One of the most commonly emphasized aspects of community policing is the necessity
for the community to participate in order maintenance. The father of metropolitan policing, Sir
Robert Peel, stated that police could not effectively manage their jurisdictions without the
support of the public (Emsley, 2013). Trajanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) reinforced this point,
when introducing community-oriented policing, asserting that the community must play a role in
policy-making decisions with the police. This argument is partially supported by findings in this
dissertation, which designate that agencies utilizing community input are more likely to comply
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with the IACP model policy (r = .162, p < .10), while also adopting negotiated management (r =
.158, p < .10) tactics. However, agencies utilizing community input are also more likely to adopt
command and control practices (r = .205, p < .05).
Along with diversifying and employing community input, advocates find the role of
higher education to be advantageous for agencies to promote community-oriented policing (Peak
& Sousa, 2018). College educated officers have been praised for being more understanding of
human behavior and more aware of community issues (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Additionally,
those officers with higher educational attainment have been found to rely on force less often
(Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). Previous research accentuates the necessity for education
within policing. However, while research suggests that educating police, at least partially,
improves community relations (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000), the education of the public is rarely
discussed.
Negotiated management thrives when there are successful relationships built between
police and protest organizers (King, 2013). This study finds that agencies that have more highly
educated officers (B = .311, p < .05) and serve more educated populations (B = .189, p < .10) are
more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics. This finding implies that the adoption of
negotiated management tactics may be correlated with the education of both police and
community residents. Future research should further examine this relationship.
Finally, while the use of community-oriented policing has been associated with the use of
negotiated management tactics, this dissertation finds that there is also a relationship between
community-oriented policing and command and control practices. Kelling (2019) contends that
community-oriented policing is sometimes portrayed as a soft approach to crime. However,
community-policing strategies are tailored to community concerns and can involve aggressive
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crime control tactics. This argument aligns with the findings produced within this dissertation.
Agency use of community-oriented policing tactics is correlated with use of command and
control tactics, which are defined by the use of restrictive measures for protest management. As
such, this dissertation expands upon previous research by revealing an association between
community-oriented policing and multiple protest management strategies, beyond negotiated
management.
Strict Enforcement and Use of Force
The current dissertation highlights the effect of jurisdiction-level characteristics on the
adoption of command and control tactics. While this study examines the relationship between
both agency- and jurisdiction-level variables and multiple crowd management strategies,
jurisdictional characteristics are found to be related to only the command and control model.
Command and control tactics are primarily employed to minimize community disruption (Vitale,
2005). As such, when an agency serves larger populations that may be seen as threatening to the
greater society, they may be more likely to adopt restrictive tactics for protest crowds. The
current study finds that those agencies serving larger populations (r = .196, p < .05) are more
likely to adopt command and control tactics. Additionally, agencies serving larger black
populations (r = .221, p < .05) are also more likely to align with command and control tactics.
Those agencies policing areas with higher violent crime (r = .194, p < .05) and unemployment
rates (.155, p < .10) tend to adopt command and control tactics more often, as well. Regression
models reveal that larger agencies (B = .230, p < .10) serving larger populations (B = .185, p <
.10) typically align with command and control strategies.
LeGrande (1967) historically stated that the most widely accepted police strategy in the
United States is a strict enforcement policy, where all parties are treated equally under the law.
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However, Harcourt (1998; 2001) suggests that this is not the case and strict enforcement
strategies lead to perceived discriminatory practices that unfairly affect minorities and the lower
class. These populations are often equated with disruptive behavior (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). The
current study’s findings reveal that areas with greater levels of disorganization and more
minorities– higher violent crime rate, higher unemployment rate, larger population, and larger
Black populations – tend to align with the use of restrictive protest management strategies.
Communities with larger Black populations tend to have more negative perceptions of police
(Peck, 2015), thus creating more tension during interactions. However, while the social
disorganization literature stresses the influence of poverty, findings from this analysis indicate
that poverty levels are not associated with more restrictive policing tactics. While poverty levels
are often included in social disorganization studies, some research suggests that income
inequality may be a better representation of this concept (Kawachi et al., 1999). Income
inequality leads to feelings of perceived deprivation (Runcimann, 1966), which in turn can result
in disorderly behavior, or in extreme cases, violence (Piven & Cloward, 2012). As such, it is
possible that the adoption of command and control tactics is correlated with income inequality,
rather than general poverty levels. Overall, as police struggle to manage these types of social
issues – violent crime, unemployment, larger populations, and negative community relations –
their approach to crowd management may be to adopt more restrictive measures.
While areas with more disorganization and larger Black populations are more likely to
use command and control tactics, areas with more black community residents are also more
likely to experience the use of escalated tactics. Previous research suggests that racially
motivated protests are more likely to be violent and that black demonstrators hold higher
propensities for violence, due to the lack of legitimate opportunity to affect social change
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(Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Rickford
(2016) asserts that Black Lives Matter protests may not be as violent as the media portrays.
However, the media’s portrayal of this movement as violent may lead police to adopt more
restrictive practices and employ guidance on use of force tactics as a contingency for these types
of demonstrations. While this study finds that areas with larger black populations align with
escalated force strategies, it does not necessarily mean that police are using more force against
protestors in these areas. From the current findings, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that
agencies in these areas are more likely to include plans for use of force, should force prove
necessary.
Regional Differences
Previous research finds regional differences in protests, namely that some regions are
more likely to experience violent protest outcomes than others (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger,
1973). As such, one might expect police policies governing protests to also vary by region. This
study finds regional variation in the policies implemented for protest management. Northeastern
agencies are less likely to align with the IACP model policy and negotiated management
strategies. Western agencies are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP and
less likely to adopt escalated force tactics. Western police agencies may be more likely to adopt
best practices due to the methods used to construct their policies. For example, approximately
95% of police agencies in California rely on private corporations (i.e., Lexipol) to create their
policies (Eagly & Schwartz, 2018). According to Reaves (2011), there are over 500 agencies in
California alone, which accounts for a large portion of agencies in the Western United States.
Agency policies in the West reveal greater alignment with the IACP model policy – adoption of
planning and dialog, limited use of restriction, and guidance on use of force. The higher
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compliance scores on the IACP scale for Western U.S. agencies may be due to the use of
privatized corporations for policy construction in this region of the United States,
Finally, Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics.
The Southern United States has a history of racial hostility, that has repeatedly resulted in
violence (Blee, 2005). As such, some may suggest that racism can explain the finding that
Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics. However, this study does not
include measures of police bias or racism. Conclusions concerning the association between the
use of escalated force and police bias cannot be drawn from the current analyses and further
research is warranted. As previously mentioned, this study finds that escalated force tactics are
most prominent in areas with larger black populations. The 2010 U.S. Census revealed that the
highest concentration of black Americans was in the Southern United States (Rastogi, Johnson,
Hoeffel, & Drewery, 2011). As such, the finding that the Southern United States is also more
likely to adopt these tactics is not surprising. Isaac and colleagues (1980) suggest members of the
black community may have higher propensities for violence during protests. Previous research
contends that this population relies on violence to enact social change due to a lack of legitimate
opportunity to voice their opinion in alternate arenas (e.g., criminal justice system, political
system, etc.) (Isaac et al., 1980; Piven & Cloward, 2012). This finding coupled with the fact that
police may perceive Black groups to be more threatening (Davenport et al., 2011) can help to
explain why escalated force crowd management strategies are more likely to be adopted by
Southern police agencies.
While it appears that place matters, region alone cannot explain all, or even most, of the
observed agency policy differences. Future research might examine interaction effects between
region and other agency/jurisdiction-level variables to further explore why some agencies are
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more likely to adopt best practices. Further, examining these interactions might provide
additional insight into why particular agencies embrace particular types of crowd management
strategies.
Current Study: Strengths and Limitations
The primary contribution of the present study is that this research represents the first
attempt to examine current U.S. police agency protest management policies. Historically, police
protest management strategies have only been discussed theoretically. Previous research has
identified the basic elements of specific strategies (Bourne, 2011; King, 2013; McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000) and provided case studies about the
use of specific strategy tactics for single events (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale,
2005). To date, there have been no empirical examinations of police practices in the United
States to manage protest crowds. This study provides the first empirical assessment of U.S.
police protest management strategies. It offers insight into variation among agency policies, the
degree to which they align with best practice standards, and agency adoption of particular protest
management strategies.
Previous literature highlights the correlation between protest violence and police presence
(Davenport et al., 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Eisinger, 1973). However, no empirical studies have
examined the mediating effect of protest management strategies on protest violence. This
dissertation provides evidence that police policies differ dramatically across agencies. The
differences documented in the current analysis can be used to guide future observational studies
and empirical research on police protest management and protest crowd behavior.
While the first of its kind, there are several limitations to this exploratory study. First, the
sample of police agencies included in this study is relatively small. Power calculations indicate
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that a random sample of 267 agencies is needed to generate appropriate power levels to identify
true agency differences and appropriately generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies. As
such, the sample within this study (n = 117), while stratified to obtain a comprehensive cross
section of different sized agencies across various regions of the country, did not produce findings
generalizable to all police agencies in the United States. However, these initial findings still
demonstrate the vast differences among U.S. police protest management policies and hold
potential to guide future protest management studies in the United States.
Second, this study offers a content analysis of police policies. Qualitative methods,
especially content analyses, are often criticized for the subjectivity associated with their
interpretation (Patton, 2015). The policy content examined in this study is documented using
dichotomous measures, which constrains interpretation by limiting potential responses. Still,
some subjectivity is introduced with any coding procedure. This study attempts to control for this
limitation by using independent coders to measure the degree of interrater reliability. Two coders
examined police policies and indicated whether or not particular crowd management tactics were
present in each agency’s policies. Initial analysis revealed an interrater reliability score of .866.
McHugh (2012) contends that .800 is the minimum acceptable standard to ensure coding
reliability. For policies where coder discrepancies existed, a neutral-third party was asked to
recode the answers based on their interpretation of the policy. This coding was then included as
the final value for the data.
Third, many of the variables in this study (i.e., use of force, community policing) are
measured dichotomously, restricting variation within the data. These variables represent complex
concepts and interactions that may not be appropriately captured using binary attributes.
Research employing more robust measures may produce different findings.
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Fourth, this study only includes police agencies serving populations of over 25,000.
Those agencies serving smaller populations are not represented within this sample, thus no
conclusions can be drawn concerning agency policies in smaller jurisdictions. Future research
may include agencies of all sizes. Since protests generally occur in urban areas, smaller agencies
may not have policies governing these activities. Still, further evaluation is needed to explore
whether this hypothesis is accurate and determine, if policies exist, the degree to which these
policies differ from those of larger agencies.
Fifth, recent studies have introduced an additional protest management strategy, strategic
incapacitation, discussed within the literature as an alternative to negotiated management
(Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). However, this
strategy integrates specific tenets that define other strategies (e.g., use of force, spatial
containment). The measures used in this study were not developed to directly measure agency
adoption of strategic incapacitation tactics. As such, this dissertation does not provide insight
into the degree to which policies reflect this integrated strategy.
Sixth, the items created to code specific protest management strategies within the model
policy are presented in a manner that suggests that each item aligns with only one management
strategy (i.e., negotiated management, command and control, or escalated force). However,
single items may be interpreted as representative of multiple strategies. For instance, the reversecoded item, “Does the policy require officers to maintain a courteous demeanor during the
event,” was created to measure alignment with escalated force. However, this item, if not reverse
coded is symbolic of negotiated management. The items created are this author’s subjective
interpretations of tactics that represent existing protest strategies. This is the first attempt to
identify specific tactics, outlined in policy, that represent each strategy. Future research may
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employ a different coding scheme or identify different tactics that align with each strategy and,
thus, produce different findings.
Seventh, agency compliance and alignment scores could be biased for specific items. For
example, those questions pertaining to canine or other specialized units may have generated
misleading results. For example, agencies that do not provide restrictions for canine units are
coded as not aligning with IACP recommended practices. However, this study does not control
for whether agencies currently employ canine units. Additionally, to adopt use of force policies
governing various force methods (i.e., impact weapons, impact projectiles, Tasers, chemical
agents, aerosol restraint spray), officers would first need authorization to employ the various
methods of force outlined in the IACP model policy. As such, it is important to note that the
current findings may be biased against smaller agencies that do not have the type of structure
assumed by the IACP model policy.
Finally, while all policies collected for this study contain dates that suggest the policies
were written or revised after August 2014 (i.e., following the events of Ferguson), this study did
not control for when the policy was initially constructed. Many agencies require that their
policies be regularly inspected or revised (e.g., every six months or every year). However, the
revision dates may or may not reflect significant changes made to the policy, as there is no
document assessing the differences between original and revised policies. Therefore, it is not
possible to examine if or how policies have changed over time or following significant events,
like the unrest in Ferguson.
Implications
Policy implications. This research highlights the frequency in which various tactics,
including guidance on the use of force, are included in police protest management policies.
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Recent emphasis on the appropriate use of police force, including escalated force tactics, stems
from a number of controversial use of force incidents within recent years. The media has widely
covered contentious and violent police-protestor interactions (Rickford, 2016), affecting public
perceptions of police (Donovan & Klahm, 2015; Lawrence, 2000). This study’s findings
document the use of specific tactics within U.S. police policies that promote or restrict particular
police behaviors. It highlights the diversity of policy content and the degree to which current
policies reflect, or fail to reflect, best practice standards promoted by one of the largest national
police organizations – specifically the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The
relatively low degree of overall organization-level compliance with the IACP model policy
offers important insight for those looking to improve police practices. This finding also leads to
two important questions. First, what factors encourage (or allow) police agencies to align their
policies with national-level standards? Although the current study begins to explore this
question, much more work is needed to identify the contexts in which agencies are most likely to
adopt national standards. Second, does adopting best practice standards improve protest
outcomes? Again, this question cannot be answered without further investigation.
This study finds that only about one-third of 15 examined negotiated management tactics
are present in the average U.S. police agency protest management policy. Yet, international
research suggests that negotiated management techniques help police to reduce protest violence.
For example, dialog policing is hailed as one of the most popular and successful protest
management strategies used to prevent protest violence in other countries (Gorringe, Stott, &
Rosie, 2012). This strategy has been adopted in several countries, including Sweden, Canada,
and the United Kingdom. The popularity of dialog policing in Western countries has led to an
emergence of dialog-based approaches in the United States, including the use of related
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negotiated management tactics. There is some evidence to suggest that negotiated management,
and other communication-focused strategies, can be effective at preventing protest violence
(Baker, 2008; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). This study suggests that there is room to increase and
improve our use of negotiated management tactics through policy revisions. The adoption of this
strategy encourages police to engage in impactful negotiation with protest organizers throughout
the demonstration process and could potentially reduce violent protest incidents that occur due to
preventable negative police-protestor interactions.
Finally, this study offers insight for professional organizations that construct and
distribute model policies. The analyses reveal that most agencies policies have a low level of
alignment with the tactics promoted by the best practice model policy used in this study.
Professional organizations, in this case IACP, may want to attempt to determine why agencies
are not aligning their policies with the proposed model. However, it may be the case that these
model policies prove most helpful for agencies in turmoil. One interesting finding from this
study is the agency that aligns perfectly with practices advocated by the IACP has a history of
crowd violence at protests. As such, the model policies provided by professional organizations
may influence agencies who are pressured alter their protest management practices in times of
crisis, but do not greatly affect agencies that are not facing professional or public scrutiny.
Directions for future research. This study’s findings and limitations offer considerable
guidance for future research. First, future research may examine the impact of additional agencyand jurisdiction-level characteristics on the adoption of particular police policies. As mentioned
previously, the variables in this study are largely dichotomous, so future studies with more robust
measures may provide greater insight into the factors that impact the adoption of best practices
or certain protest management strategies. While the overall statistical models within this study do
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not reach significance levels, future research may identify other characteristics that help to
explain policy content. Other variables that would likely influence policy, like numbers of
jurisdictional protests or the level of crowd management training provided to officers, are beyond
the scope of the current study.
Both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the impact of agency policy on police
officer behavior would greatly benefit both theory and practice. This study assumes that agency
policy drives officer behavior, but this cannot be confirmed without further investigation.
Differences between policy and practice, if any exist, have important implications for protest
management. This type of investigation can also highlight critical areas in which police
administrators can improve officer training to better affect protest outcomes.
Finally, future research might examine the timing of the tactics adopted for protest
management. The “Ferguson Effect” hypothesized that negative perceptions of police in the
United States, following the events in Ferguson, caused violent crime rates to increase. Some
research suggests that this effect is purely anecdotal and is not supported by data (Pyrooz,
Decker, Wolfe, & Shjarback, 2016). However, Wolfe & Nix (2016) state that other areas of
policing may be experiencing a Ferguson Effect. This begs the question, “Did the events of
Ferguson lead agencies to alter their protest management practices?” If possible, future research
should examine the timing of policy changes within U.S. police agencies to determine whether
such changes have occurred, or are more likely to occur following high-profile incidents.
Final Thoughts
This study represents a first attempt at documenting the diversity and types of strategies
used by U.S. police agencies to manage protest crowds and activities. While the impact of police
presence on protests was explored several decades ago (Eisinger, 1973), little additional
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empirical research has been conducted. Most extant literature provides theoretical contexts for
classifying and understanding the impact that specific policing strategies have had on protests in
Western democracies (e.g., see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). Protest scholars note that escalated
force strategies were developed and used during the 1960’s and 1970’s (McPhail,
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), command and control during the
1980’s (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005), and negotiated management from the 1990’s to present
(Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale, 2005).
This study examined police policies pertaining to protest management to assess the
degree of compliance with the IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control, as well
as alignment with existing protest management strategies. Additionally, agency- and jurisdictionlevel characteristics were examined to determine if specific factors are associated with agency
adoption of best practices or specific types of crowd management strategies. Both qualitative and
quantitative methods were used to identify specific tactics within the IACP model policy and
build an instrument to measure agency compliance with this policy, as well as alignment with
specific management strategies. The findings of this study indicate that there is a large degree of
variation in the types of tactics found within U.S. police protest management policies. Although
the three major strategies examined in this study are typically discussed as fitting neatly into
historical eras, U.S. police agencies currently permit and require the use of tactics that align with
all three of these strategies. As such, this study suggests that agencies have not replaced one
specific strategy with another, rather, police manage protests using a variety of tactics developed
over time to address the complexities of modern-day protest management. While negotiated
management tactics help police to engage with protest organizers and plan for events, command
and control tactics are useful for addressing disorderly crowds and escalated force tactics may be
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needed to address protestors who engage in violence or management protests that evolve into
civil disturbances.
This study provides insight into the types of tactics employed by police in the United
States to manage protest crowds. While previous literature provides theoretical frameworks that
explain the development and purpose of various strategies, this is the first study to empirically
assess the degree to which these tactics are incorporated into police policies. As such, this
dissertation provides a preliminary framework to further evaluate protest management policies
and the impact of police strategies on the occurrence of protest violence.
The impact of police policy and practice on protest outcomes remains a worthy and
mostly unexplored research topic. While protest violence is a rare occurrence (Davenport et al.,
2011), the consequences associated with it can prove quite disastrous for participants and the
surrounding community. As such, it is essential that future research continue to explore the
impact of specific agency policies on police practice and protest outcomes.
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APPENDIX A
Protest Strategy Information Table

Table 19: Protest Strategy Information Table
Protest Management
Strategy

Time Frame
(According to
Literature)

Theoretical Basis

Escalated Force

1960’s and 1970’s

Le Bon’s Contagion
Theory

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Ignore First Amendment Rights
No tolerance for community disruption
No communication with protesters
Mass Arrest
Indiscriminate use of force

Command and
Control

1980’s

Strict Enforcement

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Minimal community disruption
Controlled access
Divide and conquer protesters
“Shock and awe” distribution of officers
Zero tolerance policing

Negotiated
Management

1990’s to present

Community-Oriented
Policing

1. Trust between police and protesters
2. Transparency in discretionary process
3. Dialog between police and protesters

Strategic
Incapacitation

2000’s to Present

Elaborated Social
Identity Model

1. Focused component of use of force
2. Focused component of arrest
3. Perceived legitimacy of police action
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Central Tenets

APPENDIX B
Protest Strategy Instrument Items and Justifications
Negotiated Management Coding Items

Protest Instrument Item
1. Does the policy prioritize the
protection of First Amendment
rights?

IACP
Reference
II. Policy

2. Does the policy utilize the
Incident Command System or
National Incident Management
System protocol for crowd
management?
3. Does the policy require that
protests be photographed and/or
video recorded?

A3

4. Does the policy require
supervisory approval before an
officer can make an arrest?
5. Does the policy require a
supervisor to submit a written
action plan for demonstrations?
6. Does the policy require an
effort to contact protest
organizers before the event?

B1

A7

D1

D2

Rationale for Inclusion
Negotiated management strategies perceive protest crowds as exercising First
Amendment rights, whereas other strategies view them as disorderly and
destructive. This item examines whether agencies prioritize the facilitation of
constitutional rights, as well as safety and security.
Negotiated management strategies emphasize the use of planning and organization
for demonstrations. By utilizing the ICS or NIMS protocol, agencies emphasize
the importance of organization during these types of events.

As negotiated management strategies are built upon trust and coordination
between police and demonstrators, utilizing video and photographs accentuates the
transparency of the tactics police employ. Transparency is essential for trust and
cooperation.
Negotiated management strategies call for arrest to be used as a last resort. By
stipulating that arrests must be approved by supervisors, agencies are ensuring that
they are truly justified in using this tactic.
Negotiated management strategies emphasize pre-planning for demonstrations.
Requiring a written action plan by a supervisor promotes advance consideration of
potential risks and police response to those risks.
Negotiated management strategies promote trust and coordination between police
and demonstrators by requiring attempts to establish pre-event contact and
relationship building. Pre-event contact allows police and protest leaders to
express their objectives and outline agreed upon acceptable behavior prior to the
event.
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7. Does the policy require an
attempt to gather information on
the event before it begins?
8. Does the policy require police
to determine if necessary permits
have been issued prior to the
event?
9. Does the policy stipulate that
police should determine whether
additional personnel should be
available when planning for the
event?
10. Does the policy require
officers to maintain a neutral
demeanor during the event?

D2

D2i

D2l

D7

11. Does the policy require
continued police contact with
protest organizers to gather
intelligence throughout the
demonstration?
12. Does the policy include
directives for officers responding
to a spontaneous civil
disturbance?

D9

13. Does the policy stipulate that
traffic should be rerouted during
spontaneous civil disturbances?
14. Does the policy require the
use of dialog between police and
crowd members as a solution to
problems arising during the event

E3a

E

F1

Negotiated management strategies promote gathering intelligence to plan for
demonstrations. By gathering intelligence, police learn more about potential risk
factors to increase the effectiveness of crowd management strategies.
A large component of negotiated management strategies is the use of permits to
outline acceptable crowd behavior. By reviewing whether there is a need for
permit applications and whether applications have been submitted, police can
promote lawful compliance by event organizers.
Negotiated management strategies emphasize planning contingencies. Outlining
whether additional personnel are necessary ensures that police are prepared for
potential contingencies.

Negotiated management strategies stipulate that police should work with
protesters to promote peaceful demonstrations. Impartial police behavior can
facilitate higher levels of positive interaction between police and potentially
adversarial groups.
A central component of negotiated management strategies is police use of dialog
during protests. Maintaining communication with protest organizers is essential to
understand shifting dynamics of the event.

As negotiated management strategies stress the importance of a planning
approach, police should have contingencies for numerous outcomes. This includes
a response plan for unplanned events that turn violent. By providing contingencies
for unplanned occurrences, police can diminish the possibility of violence or other
negative outcomes.
Negotiated management strategies emphasize police planning prior to events. This
includes outlining contingencies to address foreseeable risks (e.g., traffic
accidents) likely to occur during a spontaneous event.
Negotiated management strategies acknowledge that police dialog with protesters
helps to deter violence and advocates the use of dialog as a first response to issues
arising throughout the event.
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prior to the use of other tactics
(e.g., dispersal)?
15. Does the policy require the
police to issue verbal warnings to
disperse before engaging in
forced crowd dispersal tactics?

F3

Negotiated management strategies state that physical crowd dispersal tactics
should be a last resort, when dialog is not possible or not effective. As such, by
utilizing verbal commands first, police can reduce the potential for police use of
force.
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Command and Control Coding Items
Protest Instrument Item
1. Does the policy restrict time of
protest to prevent community
disruption?

IACP
Reference
A1

2. Does the policy restrict place
of protest to prevent community
disruption?

A1

3. Does the policy restrict manner
of protest to prevent community
disruption?

A1

4. Does the policy prohibit canine
units from being used for crowd
control (i.e., spatial containment
or dispersal)?
5. Does the policy permit motor
vehicles to be used for spatial
containment?
6. Does the policy require an
avenue of escape for crowds after
chemical agents are deployed?

B3a

B3c

B3g

7. Does the policy allow batons to
be used for spatial containment?

B3h

8. Does the policy restrict
bystanders from entering
disturbance areas (e.g., only

D8

Rationale for Inclusion
Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective,
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can
demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective,
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can
demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective,
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can
demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
The IACP model policy prohibits canine units being used for crowd control
purposes. Spatial containment is a defining tenet of command and control so
ensuring that canine units cannot be used for spatial containment opposes the
idea of command and control. This item will be reverse coded.
As mentioned previously, spatial containment is a central component of
command and control strategies. Utilizing motor vehicles as barricades would
align with these same strategies.
Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control.
This involves corralling crowds into a contained area. Utilizing chemical agents
without an avenue of escape would align with command and control strategies.
This item will be reverse coded.
Spatial containment is a central component of command and control strategies.
Utilizing batons to assist in spatial containment aligns with command and control
strategies.
Spatial containment is used to minimize community disruption. According to
command and control strategies, protest crowds are acceptable as long as they do
not disrupt legitimate community activity. Restricting bystanders from entering
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permitting those who reside, are
employed, or have emergency
business in the area)?
9. Does the policy require that a
perimeter be established during a
civil disturbance?
10. Does the policy allow for the
use of barricades or police lines
to contain crowd members in
order to prevent community
disruption?
11. Does the policy permit police
to engage in shows of force to
control crowd behavior?
12. Does the policy allow police
lines to be formed to disperse
unruly crowds that fail to vacate
the location following verbal
directives?
13. Does the policy allow the use
of mobile field forces, or other
specialized units (e.g., mounted,
motorcycle), to disperse unruly
crowds that fail to disperse
following verbal directives?
14. Does the policy permit crowd
encirclement tactics to disperse
unruly crowds that fail to disperse
following verbal directives?

the area aligns with this strategy because it diminishes the opportunity to expand
the crowd size.

E2b

F1

F3b1

F3b1

Spatial containment can be used to prevent community disruption in the event of a
civil disturbance. Establishing perimeters to contain disorderly or violent crowds
aligns with command and control strategies.
Utilizing barricades and police lines to contain crowds aligns with command and
control strategies. This strategy promotes restricting the time, manner, and
location of protest, which is often accomplished through the use of barricades.

Shows of force are often employed through tactics like police lines and
formation, which “shock and awe” the crowd into compliance. The “shock and
awe” component of crowd control, rather than crowd management tactics align
with command and control strategies.
Police lines are often used to shock and awe crowds into dispersing. The use of
these tactics aligns with command and control.

F3b1

Command and control strategies often promote the use of specialized units to
disperse crowds. These units, like mobile field forces, specialize in civil
disturbances responses that include crowd dispersal to prevent further violence.

F3b2

Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control.
This is a form of corralling crowds into an area. Utilizing these containment
tactics aligns with command and control tactics.
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15. Does the policy require police
to establish a secure detention
area for prisoners awaiting
transportation following a mass
arrest?

G2

While mass arrest is a tactic employed under escalated force strategies, utilizing
secure areas aligns with command and control tactics. Secure detention areas
restrict access to and protect detainees.
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Escalated Force Coding Items
Protest Instrument Item
1. Does the policy stipulate that
disorderly or threatening crowds
be dispersed to eliminate
immediate risk or violence
escalation?
2. Does the policy stipulate that
demonstrators engaging in
unlawful behavior will be
arrested?
3. Does the policy allow for mass
arrests during civil disturbances?

IACP
Reference
A4b

A4c, F1c

A6, F2,
F3b3, G

4. Does the policy prohibit firing
impact projectiles into the crowd
indiscriminately?

B3d

5. Does the agency prohibit the
firing of non-direct skip fire
rounds indiscriminately into
crowds unless life is in immediate
danger?
6. Does the policy advise that
direct fire rounds should be used
only against those who pose a
threat of death to others or
significant property damage?

B3d1

B3d2

Rationale for Inclusion
Escalated force strategies embrace dispersal tactics as a legitimate crowd
management strategy. Therefore, this item will measure whether advisement for
dispersal tactics are included in the policy.

While negotiated management strategies employ arrest symbolically or as a last
resort, escalated force strategies employ arrest as an initial response to unlawful
behavior. Agencies adopting this approach typically employ legalistic approaches
to unlawful behavior.
Escalated force strategies typically employ mass arrest during civil disturbances.
Mass arrest tactics are employed to disperse crowds in an attempt to prevent
further violence.
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, rather
than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated
force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item
will be reverse coded.
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, rather
than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated
force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item
will be reverse coded.
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. The IACP policy
advocates targeting only individuals engaged in harmful behavior, rather than the
entire crowd. As such, this policy item directly opposes the indiscriminate
application of force promoted by escalated force strategies. This item will be
reverse coded.
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7. Does the policy prohibit the
use of Electronic Control
Weapons (ECW’s) for the
purpose of restraint or arrest
when less forceful measures of
control are available?
8. Does the policy prohibit the
firing of Electronic Control
Weapons (ECW’s) into the crowd
indiscriminately?
9. Does the policy prohibit
aerosol restraint sprays from
being fired into the crowd where
bystanders would be
unreasonably affected?
10. Does the policy restrict the
application of aerosol restraint
sprays to only individuals
engaging in unlawful behavior,
resisting arrest, or those who pose
a threat to officer safety (i.e., in
self-defense)?
11. Does the policy restrict the
use of CS chemical agents to
instances when lesser force
options are unavailable or would
be ineffective?
12. Does the policy allow batons
to be used for crowd dispersal?
13. Does the policy require
officers to maintain a courteous
demeanor during the event?

B3e

Escalated force strategies emphasize the use of force to uphold the law and
disperse crowds. This is typically accomplished through use of force and arrest,
rather than less forceful or intrusive measures. This item will be reverse coded.

B3e

Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, the
escalated force approach does not require differential treatment of individual
crowd members. This item will be reverse coded.

B3f

Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd
by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component
of these strategies. Therefore, escalated force would employ these tactics without
accounting for bystanders. This item will be reverse coded.

B3f

Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd
by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component
of these strategies. Escalated force would argue that crowds should be targeted as
a whole, rather than focusing solely on problematic individuals. As such, this
item opposes the central tenets of escalated force strategies and will be reverse
coded.

B3g

Escalated force strategies prioritize arrest and use of force as being the most
appropriate responses to aggression. Utilizing chemical agents when lesser force
options would still be effective to disperse the crowd would align with escalated
force strategies. Therefore, this item opposes the central tenets of the escalated
force model and will be reverse coded.
Escalated force strategies promote police use of force as a means of crowd
dispersal. As such, utilizing weapons for this purpose would align with escalated
force strategies.
Courteous behavior promotes positive interaction between police and
participants. However, this type of behavior is antithetical to escalated force
strategies. This item will be reverse coded.

B3h

D7
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14. Does the policy restrict crowd
control tactics (e.g., use of force,
containment, dispersal, or mass
arrests) to civil disturbances?
15. Does the policy allow police
to carry resistant demonstrators
when they refuse to walk?

III.
Definitions

G4

The indiscriminate application of crowd control tactics including show of force,
use of force, and the use of less-lethal weapons to gain crowd compliance aligns
with escalated force strategies. This item assesses whether policies restrict crowd
control tactics to civil disturbances, and is therefore antithetical to escalated force
strategies. As such, this item will be reverse coded.
Escalated force strategies promote the use of force when there is non-compliance
among individuals within the crowd. By allowing police to physically remove
noncompliant protesters, agencies promote officer behavior aligned with
escalated force strategies.

125

APPENDIX C
Sample Agencies, By Strata
Population Size
500,000+

Region of the United
States
N/A

Agency Name

City

State

Tucson Police
Department
Fresno Police
Department
San Francisco Police
Department
San Jose Police
Department
San Diego Police
Department
Los Angeles Police
Department
Denver Police
Department
Washington Metro
Police Department
Miami-Dade County
Police Department
Cobb County Police
Department
Dekalb County Police
Department
Gwinnett County Police
Department
Chicago Police
Department

Tucson

AZ

Fresno

CA

San Francisco

CA

San Jose

CA

San Diego

CA

Los Angeles

CA

Denver

CO

--

DC

Miami

FL

Marietta

GA

Tucker

GA

Lawrenceville

GA

Chicago

IL
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Indianapolis Metro
Police
Louisville Metro Police
Department
Baltimore Police
Department
Prince George’s County
Police Department
Baltimore County
Police Department
Montgomery County
Police Department
Detroit Police
Department
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department
Albuquerque Police
Department
Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department
Nassau County Police
Department
Suffolk County Police
Department
New York City Police
Department
Columbus Police
Department
Oklahoma City Police
Department
Portland Police
Bureau
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Indianapolis

IN

Louisville

KY

Baltimore

MD

Palmer Park

MD

Towson

MD

Rockville

MD

Detroit

MI

Charlotte

NC

Albuquerque

NM

Las Vegas

NV

Mineola

NY

Yaphank

NY

New York

NY

Columbus

OH

Oklahoma City

OK

Portland

OR

200,000 – 499,999

West

Midwest

Philadelphia Police
Department
Nashville Metro Police
Department
El Paso Police
Department
Fort Worth Police
Department
Austin Police
Department
Dallas Police
Department
San Antonio Police
Department
Fairfax County Police
Department
Seattle Police
Department
Milwaukee Police
Department
North Las Vegas Police
Department
Riverside Police
Department
Oakland Police
Department
Long Beach Police
Department
Boise Police
Department
Minneapolis Police
Department
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Philadelphia

PA

Nashville

TN

El Paso

TX

Fort Worth

TX

Austin

TX

Dallas

TX

San Antonio

TX

Fairfax

VA

Seattle

WA

Milwaukee

WI

North Las Vegas

NV

Riverside

CA

Oakland

CA

Long Beach

CA

Boise

ID

Minneapolis

MN

South

Northeast

100,000-199,999

West

Wichita Police
Department
St. Louis County Police
Department
Omaha Police
Department
Cincinnati Police
Department
Lexington Police
Department
Orlando Police
Department
Fayetteville Police
Department
Durham Police
Department
Raleigh Police
Department
Rochester Police
Department
Newark Police
Department
Pittsburgh Bureau of
Police
El Cajon Police
Department
Fullerton Police
Department
Boulder Police
Department
Peoria Police
Department
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Wichita

KS

St. Louis

MO

Omaha

NE

Cincinnati

OH

Lexington

KY

Orlando

FL

Fayetteville

NC

Durham

NC

Raleigh

NC

Rochester

NY

Newark

NJ

Pittsburgh

PA

El Cajon

CA

Fullerton

CA

Boulder

CO

Peoria

AZ

Midwest

South

Northeast

Lakewood Police
Department
Elgin Police
Department
Aurora Police
Department
Grand Rapids Police
Department
Springfield Police
Department
Columbia Police
Department
Alexandria Police
Department
Henry County Police
Department
Knoxville Police
Department
Charleston Police
Department
Columbia Police
Department
New Haven Police
Department
Cambridge Police
Department
Woodbridge Township
Police Department
Amherst Police
Department
Providence Police
Department
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Lakewood

CO

Elgin

IL

Aurora

IL

Grand Rapids

MI

Springfield

MO

Columbia

MO

Alexandria

VA

McDonough

GA

Knoxville

TN

Charleston

SC

Columbia

SC

New Haven

CT

Cambridge

MA

Woodbridge

NJ

Amherst

NY

Providence

RI

50,000-99,999

West

Midwest

South

Northeast

Kirkland Police
Department
Davis Police
Department
Newport Beach Police
Department
Loveland Police
Department
Rio Rancho Department
of Public Safety
Iowa City Police
Department
Waterloo Police
Department
Evanston Police
Department
Duluth Police
Department
Bellevue Police
Department
Lakeland Police
Department
Bowie Police
Department
Chapel Hill Police
Department
Asheville Police
Department
Fayetteville Police
Department
Framingham Police
Department
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Kirkland

WA

Davis

CA

Newport Beach

CA

Loveland

CO

Rio Rancho

NM

Iowa City

IA

Waterloo

IA

Evanston

IL

Duluth

MN

Bellevue

NE

Lakeland

FL

Bowie

MD

Chapel Hill

NC

Asheville

NC

Fayeteville

AR

Framingham

MA

25,000-49,999

West

Midwest

South

Brookline Police
Department
Somerville Police
Department
Albany Police
Department
Lower Merion
Township Police
Department
Tigard Police
Department
Oro Valley Police
Department
Bell Police
Department
Beverly Hills Police
Department
Culver City Police
Department
Burbank Police
Department
Urbana Police
Department
Roseville Police
Department
Gladstone Police
Department
Greenfield Police
Department
Gainesville Police
Department
Myrtle Beach Police
Department
132

Brookline

MA

Somerville

MA

Albany

NY

Ardmore

PA

Tigard

OR

Oro Valley

AZ

Bell

CA

Beverly Hills

CA

Culver City

CA

Burbank

IL

Urbana

IL

Roseville

MN

Gladstone

MO

Greenfield

WI

Gainesville

GA

Myrtle Beach

SC

Northeast

Greenville Police
Department
Texarkana Police
Department
Lancaster Police
Department
Watertown Police
Department
Amherst Police
Department
Concord Police
Department
Yorktown Police
Department
Chester Police
Department
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Greenville

TX

Texarkana

TX

Lancaster

TX

Watertown

MA

Amherst

MA

Concord

NH

Yorktown Heights

NY

Chester

PA
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Criminology
Dept. of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2015

Madensen, T. & Kennedy, L., Guest Speaker for “Culminating Experience Faculty
Institute” on Teaching Undergraduate Research
University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Lied Library, Las Vegas, NV.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
2019

CRJ 104 – Introduction to Administration of Justice: In Person Section
Nevada State College

2019

CRJ 413 – Dilemmas in Law Enforcement: In Person Section
Nevada State College

2019

CRJ 444 – Advanced Criminology: In Person Section
Nevada State College

2018

CRJ 211 – Policing in America: Hybrid Section
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2018

CRJ 211 – Policing in America: Online Section
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2013- Present

Lab Director – Crowd Management Research Council
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2013-Present

Graduate Mentor – Crowd Management Research Council
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

150

